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Agricultural productivity of smallholder farmers in Uganda is low, and only a small amount of farmers apply 
new technologies. The decision to adopt new techniques is made within the agrarian household, and 
therefore it is crucial to better understand intra-household decision-making processes. Inefficient 
household outcomes are partly due to limited cooperation within households. We use information 
asymmetry as a proxy for non-cooperative behaviour within the household. We study the relation between 
spousal information asymmetry levels and investments in more efficient agricultural production through 
the adoption of intensification practices, as measured in a survey with spouses in Northern and Western 
Uganda. While we expect to see a negative relation between information asymmetry and households’ 
investments, we did not find significant results. Besides information asymmetry, risk preferences play a 
major role in the adoption decision. Individuals have their own levels of risk aversion that potentially differ 
between spouses. We wanted to understand whose preference is decisive within the spousal bargaining 
process and tested the relation between investments in agricultural intensification and risk preferences, as 
measured in a Holt-Laury lottery. We hypothesised that the husband’s preference is taken more into 
account in the investment decision, and that risk aversion negatively relates to investments in agricultural 
intensification. Results did not show significance when measuring spousal categories with four risk 
categories, and did not show significance for husband’s preferences using round of switching as risk 
preference indicator. This last indicator, however, showed significance between wives’ switch round and 
husbands’ reported levels of investments in agricultural intensification, p<0.1. This suggests that wives’ 
risk preferences play a role in agricultural intensification, but in opposite direction from expected.   
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Agricultural productivity of smallholder farmers in Uganda is low, and only few farmers use modern seed 
varieties (FAO, 2018). While some studies focus on barriers for adoption of these varieties, paying attention 
to issues such as information and infrastructure, the adoption decision is eventually made within the 
agrarian household. Literature on intra-household decision-making suggests that households generally do 
not reach efficient outcomes (C. R. Doss & Quisumbing, 2020). Spouses potentially differ in their 
preferences, but the decisions they make affect household outcomes (Ashraf, 2009). This is also the case 
for outcomes related to agricultural productivity levels. Hence, in order to be able to improve agricultural 
productivity of smallholder farmers, it is necessary to understand the agricultural investment decision-
making process.   
In the economic field, there is a rich literature on household models. The dominant four models are the 
unitary, collective, cooperative and non-cooperative models. Besides, there are well-known hybrid models 
such as the separate spheres model, with characteristics of the non-cooperative and cooperative models 
(Munro, 2017). Important differences between these models are related to assumptions about distinct or 
aligned preferences, resource pooling and the extent to which spouses come to Pareto efficient solutions.  
Each of these models tries to represent how individuals in a household make decisions. An important factor 
in the decision-making process that affects its outcomes, is the level of cooperation between household 
members. There are different perspectives on the meaning of cooperation in the literature. In lab-in-the-
field experiments, such as in public good games in Eastern Uganda from Iversen, Jackson, Kebede, Munro, 
& Verschoor (2011), efficiency gains are realised when total surplus from cooperation is maximised. This 
implies that spouses contribute their full endowments to the common pool to attain a social optimum. Doss 
& Quisumbing (2020) emphasise the importance of joint-decision-making and joint ownership of resources, 
as a way of analysing cooperation within households.  
Spousal attributes are one factor in realising gains from cooperation, but asymmetric information within 
households is seen as another constraining factor in the process of realising the benefits of more efficient 
household decisions (Iversen et al., 2011). Several studies show a correlation between information 
asymmetry and non-cooperative outcomes, such as Chen (2013) with data from China, where household 
decision-making under asymmetric information relates to non-cooperative household allocation. In this 
study about migration, mothers spend less time in household production and income-generating activities 
when the father migrates, while children have to spend more time to this. For development contexts there 
is also evidence for the correlation between information asymmetry and non-cooperation when spouses 
live in the same houses. An example is the study by (Castilla & Walker, 2012) with experiments in rural 
Ghana, where information asymmetry goes hand in hand with income hiding. While several studies on 
household behaviour find that asymmetric information is present in households, there is a lack of 
knowledge about its impact on outcomes for households (Iversen et al., 2011). This especially holds for 
the relationship between information and household productivity, while multiple studies have researched 
how information affects household allocation (Munro, 2017). The meaning attributed to information 
asymmetry, as measured by comparing spousal responses in a questionnaire, is still lacking in current 
theory and empirical studies (Ambler, Doss, Kieran, & Passarelli, 2019). This thesis contributes to this by 
focusing on the relation between the difference in information between spouses about household assets 
and resources, and the agricultural investment decisions made by the household, where we use information 
asymmetry as a proxy for non-cooperative behaviour within the household.  
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The Women in Development (WID) and the Gender in Agriculture (GAD) paradigms of the last century did 
not pay much attention to promoting cooperation between spouses. The same holds for international donor 
literature and empirical research, that mostly focused on the effects of improving women’s bargaining 
power on outcome variables such as consumption patterns and women’s labour supply (Mccarthy & Kilic, 
2017). Because the literature was mainly focused towards bargaining models, this often neglected the role 
of cooperation within households (C. R. Doss & Quisumbing, 2020). However, analysis of panel data from 
rural couples in Malawi showed that improving cooperation within households is more strongly positively 
associated with household welfare outcomes, such as total household income and consumption 
expenditures and greater household public goods provision, compared to increasing bargaining power of 
the wife (Mccarthy & Kilic, 2017). A study in Côte d’Ivoire, where spouses have different plots and grow 
specific “male” and “female” crops, looks at how shocks to different income types affects households’ 
expenditure patterns. The study finds that allocation of household resources are not Pareto efficient, as 
rainfall shocks that affect total household expenditures in the same way, has a different effect on allocation 
to household public goods and adult or “prestige” goods (Duflo & Udry, 2004).  There has not been much 
other empirical evidence from developing countries of the positive impact of increased cooperation within 
households on its wellbeing (Mccarthy & Kilic, 2017). Lecoutere & Jassogne  (2019) did a lab-in-the-field-
experiment that measured cooperative behaviour and equitable sharing within households in Uganda. They 
find that more cooperation and equal sharing is related to more investments in efficient cash and food crop 
production. Nevertheless, the impact of household cooperation on household agricultural investments 
specifically, is still an underdeveloped domain. Much more on the relationship between cooperation and 
agricultural investments remains to be explored, and the role that information asymmetry between spouses 
plays is an important element of that.  
Another important element of the agricultural investment decision-making process in households relates 
to preferences. Making an investment implies having a risk, and agricultural production in itself entails risk 
and uncertainty (Moschini & Hennessy, 2001). Both risk and uncertainty and household preferences are 
considered major influences for agricultural adoption (Mercer, 2004). However, individuals within 
households have their own levels of risk-aversion, and therefore preferences for investment can differ 
between spouses. When this is the case, bargaining will take place in the household (Agarwal, 1997). 
Hence, in order to better understand households’ agricultural investment decisions, it is relevant to 
understand whose preference is decisive within the spousal bargaining process.  
As the household decision-making process regarding investments in agricultural intensification is crucial 
for improving productivity, this study focuses on the elements of bargaining and information asymmetry 
within households to contribute to the knowledge of this decision-making process. A better understanding 
of the role of information asymmetry and bargaining within the household is relevant for interventions that 
focus on the household or individual household members in order to improve yields. Understanding 








2.1 Household models 
An important approach in household behavioural theory has been the unitary model (Becker, 1981; 
Samuelson, 1956), that treats the household as a group of individuals with one utility curve. The underlying 
assumption is that all individuals have aligned preferences, or that a dictator makes all decisions for the 
household, and income is pooled (Annan, Donald, Goldstein, Martinez, & Koolwal, 2019). However, there 
is consensus that most households do not function according the unitary model. Preferences between 
individuals differ and instead of using all income for household resource allocation, spouses often keep part 
of their income for themselves (e.g. Munro, 2017; Udry, 1996). Therefore, income pooling is rejected.  
As the idea of a household behaving as one agent was challenged, the collective model emerged. In this 
model, different household members can have different preferences and their own utility function 
(Chiappori, 1992). Contrary to the unitary model, households generally do not completely pool their income 
in these models (Munro, 2017). A subset of collective models are so-called cooperative bargaining models, 
that are based on game theory where two individuals bargain together (C. Doss, 2013). Spouses have 
different preferences, but household choices are based on a certain weight attached to each interests. This 
weight relates amongst others to outside options for the spouses and the value of outside options. Changes 
in individual incomes for instance can possibly change spouses’ bargaining positions  (Munro, 2017).  One 
famous model is that of Manser & Brown, offering the Nash bargaining solution as a possible solution to 
the bargaining problem, which satisfies Pareto optimality (Marilyn Manser; Murray Brown, 1980). The 
general idea is that partners are forced to pareto efficient solutions as individuals want to gain at least 
their outside option, the so-called ‘threat point’. The outside option is the level of welfare if the person 
would not be part of the household (C. Doss, 2013). If this is not the case, an individual will decide to 
leave, which could also mean resolving to hiding resources and making individual decisions (C. R. Doss & 
Meinzen-Dick, 2015).  
This is where noncooperative bargaining models come into view. In these models, individuals have their 
own budget constraint, and make contributions based on the behaviour of the other person (Munro, 2017). 
While income pooling is not assumed, decision-making by household members is interrelated, and strategic 
behaviour by individuals can undermine cooperative results (C. R. Doss & Quisumbing, 2020). Households 
do not necessarily reach Pareto-efficient outcomes in this case, implying that production and consumption 
decisions lead to suboptimal outcomes (C. Doss, 2013). According to Mccarthy & Kilic (2017), non-
cooperative model hypotheses are more in line with empirics from developing countries.  
2.2 Asymmetric information 
Information asymmetry is considered an important reason why efficiency gains from cooperation are not 
realized; studies based on non-cooperative intrahousehold models showed that less asymmetric 
information and fewer differences between spouses, in terms of characteristics like age, education and 
occupation, is related to more socially efficient outcomes (Iversen et al., 2011). Therefore we hypothesise 
that there is a relation between limited information asymmetry between husbands and wives and more 
investments in agricultural intensification.  
Within households, information is not always shared between individuals, and household members can 
hide resources and actions from each other (Ambler et al., 2019). There are several studies that found 
systematic differences in responses in questionnaires between spouses, that cannot be contributed to 
measurement error (C. R. Doss & Quisumbing, 2020). In the context of Bangladesh, Ambler et al. (2019) 
looked at disagreement in perceptions of decision-making power. They found substantial and systematic 
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disagreement, where men are less likely than women to report that women have a role in decision-making 
and asset ownership. One possible explanation is information asymmetry. Ambler et al. (2019) The 
researchers also observed correlations between different agreement categories and women’s well-being. 
Annan et al. (2019) is another study that gives meaning to differences in perceptions between men and 
women about who makes the household decisions. The authors translate such differences into concepts of 
being given power or taking power, where the latter is associated with benefits for women.  
Another form of information asymmetry relates to the hiding of information about income, resources and 
assets. Results from studies about information asymmetry show that when choices are made secretly by 
individual spouses, this often leads to suboptimal results for the household. An example is the study from 
Castilla & Walker (2013), with a field experiment in Ghana. When participating in a lottery, spouses use 
their prizes differently when results are public or private, where the latter leads to hiding and choices that 
benefit the individual spouse instead of the whole household. Ambler (2015) studied the role of information 
asymmetries for resource allocation, where she finds that the possibility to hide the choice can be used 
strategically to send less remittances home. These studies show how information asymmetry often relates 
to pareto inefficient decisions for the household as a whole, as hiding income reduces the amount of income 
available for household investments. The study by Hoel (2015), with data from dictator games between 
spouses in Kenya, also shows that many spouses behave opportunistically when information asymmetry is 
present. However, the study not only looks at the average differences between behaviour in a public and 
secret game, but also analyses behaviour at the individual level. This reveals that only a minority of 
subjects takes advantage of information asymmetry, but because they behave very opportunistically in the 
secret game, this leads to high average differences in behaviour between the games. While the between-
subject analysis with average differences suggests that asymmetric information is an important cause of 
inefficient outcomes, the within-subject analysis allows other explanations (Hoel, 2015). Research on 
financial choices from the Philippines confirms that spouses make strategic choices in response to changes 
in information and communication (Ashraf, 2009). The study further suggests the importance of underlying 
household control structures that serve as incentives to behavioural changes, implying that the effect of 
information asymmetry is heterogeneous.   
While there is evidence for the relation between asymmetric information in households and inefficient 
outcomes, the relation between information asymmetry and the efficiency of agricultural outcomes is still 
an underdeveloped domain. A few studies have focused specifically on the relation between cooperation 
and agricultural outcomes of households. The empirics are mainly coming lab-in-the-field experiments with 
public good games (C. R. Doss & Quisumbing, 2020). An example is the study by Lecoutere & Jassogne 
(2019), who find a positive relation between experimentally measured cooperation and real investment in 
efficient crop production. Just like in other public good games, spouses had to decide on the amount of 
their personal resources to invest in the common household farm. In real life situations, individuals have 
to make similar decisions. If both spouses contribute their full personal endowments to the household pool, 
the household can make investments that maximise surplus for the household. When it comes to 
investments in agricultural intensification, this way of cooperating between husband and wife will 
potentially lead to more benefits from the farm for the household, as investing more in agricultural 
intensification is assumed to improve productivity (Muzari, Gatsi, & Muvhunzi, 2012). Since more 
cooperation in the household is assumed to lead to more investments in agriculture, and more information 
asymmetry goes hand in hand with limited cooperation, we likewise expect to find a negative relation 
between information asymmetry between spouses and investments in agricultural intensification by  
households. There are, however, more reasons for inefficient household decisions. Decisions for 
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investments also depend on individual preferences and relative bargaining power of spouses, amongst 
others. These topics are discussed in the next paragraph.  
2.3 Risk Preferences & Bargaining power 
There are multiple factors that influence the adoption of new agricultural technology, and there are several 
ways of categorising determinants. Technological, economic, institutional, and human specific factors are 
considered the key determinants by Mwangi & Kariuki (Mwangi & Kariuki, 2015). When it comes to human 
specific factors, individuals have their own level of preferences with regards to investing under risk, and 
this potentially differs between spouses. If there are conflicting preferences regarding agricultural 
investments – albeit because of risk preferences-, bargaining will take place within the household.  
In general, husband and wife often have different preferences when it comes to allocation of resources. 
The study from Duflo & Udry (2004) from Côte D’Ivoire shows that husbands and wives have different 
preferences towards household public goods, such as education and food, and private goods. Income 
shocks to different sources of income can create expenditure shifts, where an individual income shock 
influences bargaining power towards the preferred goods. Bargaining power itself is unable to be measured 
or observed, and studies therefore use proxies (Ambler et al., 2019; C. Doss, 2013). However, because 
both spouses often do not have equal levels of bargaining power, a spouse’s individual preferences towards 
investing under risk is expected to weigh differently in the bargaining process about household investment 
decisions.  
When facing risk, individuals have several levels of risk-averse attitudes that affect decision-making around 
production and investments. Farmers can be either risk averse, risk neutral or risk seeking. Several studies 
conclude that risk-averse farmers are less likely to adopt new technological investments, and evidence 
generally points to  risk aversion negatively influencing adoption (Marra, Pannell, & Abadi Ghadim, 2003). 
Although studies took place in different agricultural contexts, there are multiple examples from Africa that 
confirm this conclusion. In their study with households in rural Ethiopia, Knight, Weir, & Woldehanna (2003) 
find that farmers’ risk-aversion reduces the probability of adoption. Their results show that farmers that 
are not risk-averse have a higher chance of investing in new technologies as much as 25 percentage points. 
The study by Verschoor, D’Exelle & Perez-Viana (2016) in Eastern Uganda, that compares risk-taking in a 
lab-in-the field-experiment with real-life risk-taking, finds that risk-taking in the experiment is associated 
with investing in fertiliser. Besides measuring risk-taking in the experiment, a hypothetical willingness to 
take risks was inferred from a questionnaire. Like experimentally measured risk aversion, hypothetically 
measured risk aversion is correlated with investments in fertiliser, but it correlates with the risky decisions 
of growing cash crops and growing more broadly for the market as well. The authors suggest that  
hypothetically measured levels of risk taking are a better proxy for farmers’ attributes of entrepreneurship 
than risk levels as measured in their experiment (Verschoor et al., 2016). A  study using panel data from 
Tanzania and Uganda finds that smallholder farmers are generally risk-averse. One reason is that using 
modern inputs involves production risks and profit uncertainty. Besides, the costs for purchasing inputs 
like chemical fertilizer, improved seeds and pesticides is risk increasing to smallholder farmers. This implies 
that when purchasing costs of inputs increase, the costs of risk bearing increases as well (Mukasa, 2018).  
While overall a more risk-seeking attitude is related to more investments in agricultural intensification, and 
a risk-averse attitude is negatively related to investments, we are interested in the decision-making 
process when spouses differ in these attitudes. According to theory about decision-making in households 
the spouse with most bargaining power has most influence on household decisions, and therefore also on 
choices related to household investments. Therefore we are interested in knowing whether decisions about 
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investments in more efficient agriculture align more with the risk preference of the husband or the wife, in 
order to better understand how households come to inefficient household decisions.  
2.4 Research Questions 
We are interested in how decision-making regarding agricultural investments takes place within 
households. This interest is twofold; First, we will analyse how asymmetric information, captured by 
divergence of survey responses, is related to outcomes regarding investments in agriculture. We address 
the following research question:  
1) To what is extent and in what way is information asymmetry in households related to 
households’ investments in agricultural intensification? 
We hypothesise that more asymmetry in information will be associated with less household investments in 
agricultural intensification. This follows from the assumption that cooperation in the household leads to 
more investment in efficient agriculture, and that information asymmetry between spouses goes hand in 
hand with limited cooperation.  
Second, we will look whether the household’s adoption of intensification practices aligns with the individual 
risk preference of the husband or the wife, thereby assuming that the risk preference of the spouse with 
relatively greater bargaining power will have informed the adoption decision. The associated research 
question is:  
2) To what extent and in what way are household investments in agricultural intensification 
related to husbands’ and wives’ preferences with regard to risk? 
We hypothesise that the husband’s preference is taken more into account when households decide upon 
agricultural investments, because women often have limited bargaining power in the household in our 
study context . We also hypothesise that when individuals are more risk averse their preference is to invest 
less in agricultural intensification, as most evidence from developing contexts shows that risk aversion is 
negatively associated with adoption of new agricultural technology.  
 
3. Context 
The study uses data from Dokolo and Masindi districts in Uganda, East Africa. Dokolo district lies in the 
Northern region, while Masindi is located in the Western region of Uganda. Agriculture is very important to 
the economy in Uganda, with food crop production dominating agricultural production. Almost all 
agricultural production is rainfed, and most farmers operate on small- to medium-scale farms (FAO, 2014). 
Average farm size from older statistics reports that average holding size is 1.1 ha (UBOS, 2010, as cited 
in FAO, 2014). Usage of improved seed is low, and only 4.4% of farmers apply fertilizer (FAO, 2018). Maize 
and beans are most commonly grown crops in Masindi district. A small percentage of farmers grows 
matooke (16.9) or a cash crop like coffee (1.3%) (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2017a). Maize and beans 
are important crops for Dokolo district as well, but unlike Masindi, millet is an important food crop for many 
households, grown by 38.3% of farmers. Only 4.6% of farmers grow matooke, and very few farmers grow 
cash crops, with coffee grown by less than 1% of Dokolo households (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2017b).    
Women are rarely legal owners of land and have fewer rights, but many households perceive both spouses 
as joint land owners (C. Doss, Meinzen-Dick, & Bomuhangi, 2014). When it comes to decision-making, 
both men and women have a role in decisions on food crop production in many households, while men 
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have a stronger say in decisions on cash-crop production. When it comes to decision-making about income 
allocation from cash crops, men have a more dominant role than women (Sell & Minot, 2018).  
4. Data & Methodology 
4.1 Study sample  
We use data from a survey and a Holt Laury lottery with individuals in rural Uganda. The data originates 
from a lab-in-the-field experiment, that was conducted in 60 villages in Dokolo and Masindi districts in 
October and November 2019. Our sample is limited to respondents whose spouse also participated in the 
experiment. We use responses from 356 individual respondents, but our level of interest is that of the 
household. There are 178 couples in total, of which 95 live in Dokolo district, and 83 live in Masindi district. 
The average age of the respondents is 36.3 years old, with women being 33.0 years on average, and men 
39.5 years old. 25.8% of respondents has received at least some secondary education, while the median 
respondent has attended primary school but did not finish it. Mean land size is 5.16 acres, 58% of the 
farmers grew a local maize variety in season 2019 A (March to June). Only 2.8% of the respondents has a 
contract to sell crops or livestock, all of which live in Masindi district.  
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Study Sample 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
 N Mean St. Dev 
Age 356 36.3 11.0 
Secondary 356 0.26 0.44 
Education (8 
levels) 
355 3.03 1.66 
Land size* 354 5.16 10.4 
Local maize* 356 0.58 0.49 
Hybrid or OPV 
maize* 
356 0.36 0.48 
Contract* 356 0.028 0.17 
N 356   
Notes: 1) This table presents descriptive statistics for the study sample. Secondary= whether respondent received 
at least some secondary education (O-level or higher). Education ranges from 1=No education, to 8=University 
graduate. Local maize=whether respondent reported household has grown a local maize variety in season 2019A. 
Hybrid or OPV maize= whether respondent reported the household has grown a hybrid or OPV maize variety in 
season 2019A. Contract=whether respondent has a contract to sell crops or livestock. *Answers as given by 
individual respondent, answers can diverge between husband and wife. 
 
4.2 Indicator definitions 
The outcome indicator is the level of household investments in agricultural intensification. A household 
level information asymmetry index indicator and two indicators for individual risk preferences, are the key 
explanatory variables. We will describe the definition of the control variables as well.  
4.2.1 Outcome indicator of level of household investments in agricultural intensification 
As dependent variable we create an index variable for level of households’ investments in agricultural 
intensification, of which the lion’s share consists of variables about investments in more intensified crop 
production practices. The index is created by using the method described in Anderson (2008). More 
specifically, the summary index is a weighted mean of different standardized measures using inverse 
covariance weighting. We will create and index variable of household investments in agricultural 
intensification as reported by women, by men, and based on the average of reports by husband and wife 
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of each couple. This is done because spouses report different levels of household investments. The 
questions can be found in in Table A.1.1, the variables used in Tables 2-4.  
The index consists of three elements. First, a variable that contains information about the number of 
investments made by the household in the past five years, where reported investments are binary; either 
the household made a certain investment (=1) or not (=0). These investments can be found in table 2. 
Then, a variable that counts the number of investments made for the 5 most popular crops, being maize, 
cassava, sweet potato, groundnuts and beans that are grown by 55-97% of the respondents.1 These crop 
investments include purchasing improved seed/seedlings for the crops, using fertilizer, using pesticides, or 
hiring labour for growing the crop amongst others and are found in table 3. The third element is an 
investment variable focusing on investments in maize specifically, as the questionnaire contained many 
questions about maize investments. Maize investments are found in table 4. 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Household Agricultural Investments 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
 Husbands’ reports Wives’ reports Spouses’ average 
reports 
Growing new crops 0.663 0.545 0.604 
 (0.474) (0.499) (0.490) 
    
Buying livestock 0.764 0.725 0.744 
 (0.426) (0.448) (0.437) 
    
Getting a loan for agricultural 
purposes 
0.292 0.242 0.267 
 (0.456) (0.429) (0.443) 
    
Irrigation 0.0449 0.0337 0.0393 
 (0.208) (0.181) (0.195) 
    
Storage facilities 0.404 0.343 0.374 
 (0.492) (0.476) (0.484) 
    
Means of transportation of 
agricultural produce 
0.517 0.444 0.480 
 (0.501) (0.498) (0.500) 
    
Improving land (for 
agriculture) 
0.236 0.230 0.233 
 (0.426) (0.422) (0.423) 
    
Buying land (for agriculture) 0.185 0.135 0.160 
 (0.390) (0.343) (0.367) 
    
Hiring labour (for agriculture) 0.787 0.764 0.775 
 (0.411) (0.426) (0.418) 
    
Hiring equipment (for 
agriculture) 
0.657 0.607 0.632 
 (0.476) (0.490) (0.483) 
    
Purchasing improved quality 
seed from shops 
0.646 0.556 0.601 
 
1 One downside is that we might miss out on some investments for other crops by these farmers. However, we 
controlled the results by running regressions as well with a variable that counts investment made for all 22 
crops asked about in the questionnaire. There are no major differences between the regression results. 
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 (0.480) (0.498) (0.490) 
    
Purchasing fertilizer 0.410 0.365 0.388 
 (0.493) (0.483) (0.488) 
    
Purchasing pesticides 0.820 0.742 0.781 
 (0.385) (0.439) (0.414) 
N         178           178         178 
Note: This table consists of binary variables that show how many respondents reported whether they made 
certain agricultural investments. Mean levels are reported for husbands’, wives’ and average reported levels. 
Standard deviations are between brackets.  
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics for investments in 5 most popular crops 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    













 (0.496) (0.459) (0.481) 
    
Beans 0.0506 0.0787 0.0646 
 (0.220) (0.270) (0.246) 
    
Cassava 0.0730 0.0562 0.0646 
 (0.261) (0.231) (0.246) 
    
Groundnuts 0.0449 0.0506 0.0478 
 (0.208) (0.220) (0.214) 
    
Sweet potato 0.0225 0.0393 0.0309 
 (0.149) (0.195) (0.173) 
 
Fertilizer 
   
Maize 0.337 0.287 0.312 
 (0.474) (0.453) (0.464) 
    
Beans 0.247 0.202 0.225 
 (0.433) (0.403) (0.418) 
    
Cassava 0.0393 0.0674 0.0534 
 (0.195) (0.251) (0.225) 
    
Groundnuts 0.185 0.225 0.205 
 (0.390) (0.419) (0.404) 
    
Sweet potato 0.0562 0.0506 0.0534 
 (0.231) (0.220) (0.225) 
 
Pesticides 
   
Maize 0.657 0.522 0.590 
 (0.476) (0.501) (0.493) 
    
Beans 0.494 0.343 0.419 
 (0.501) (0.476) (0.494) 
    
Cassava 0.124 0.140 0.132 
 (0.330) (0.348) (0.339) 
    
Groundnuts 0.360 0.309 0.334 
 (0.481) (0.463) (0.472) 
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Sweet potato 0.185 0.157 0.171 
 (0.390) (0.365) (0.377) 
 
Labour 
   
Maize 0.646 0.567 0.607 
 (0.480) (0.497) (0.489) 
    
Beans 0.382 0.365 0.374 
 (0.487) (0.483) (0.484) 
    
Cassava 0.298 0.242 0.270 
 (0.459) (0.429) (0.444) 
    
Groundnuts 0.326 0.230 0.278 
 (0.470) (0.422) (0.449) 
    
Sweet potato 0.410 0.298 0.354 
 (0.493) (0.459) (0.479) 
N         178           178         178 
Note: This table consists of binary variables that show how many respondents reported whether they made 
certain investments in the 5 most popular crops. Mean levels are reported for husbands’, wives’ and average 
reported levels. Standard deviations are between brackets.  
 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for Maize Investments 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
 Husbands’ 
reports 
Wives’ reports Spouses’ 
average reports 
Improved Maize Variety* 0.427 0.275 0.351 
 (0.496) (0.448) (0.478) 
    
Strings/Ropes 0.298 0.208 0.253 
 (0.459) (0.407) (0.435) 
    
Row planting 0.899 0.899 0.899 
 (0.302) (0.302) (0.302) 
N 356   
Note: This table consists of binary variables that shows information on maize investments. Mean levels are 
reported for husbands’, wives’ and average reported levels. Standard deviations are between brackets. *Whether 
respondent has used OPV or hybrid maize variety.  
 
4.2.2 Information asymmetry index variable 
A variable that captures the degree of information asymmetry between spouses will be the explanatory 
variable in a model testing the relation between agricultural intensification by the household and spousal 
information asymmetry levels. In order to measure the extent of asymmetric information, we make a 
summary index variable using the method described in Anderson (2008). The summary index is a weighted 
mean of different standardized measures using inverse covariance weighting. This index variable contains 
information about the degree of information asymmetry between spouses, measured by the amount of 
differences in responses on questions about household assets and other resources. These questions can 
be found in Table A.1.2, descriptive statistics for the variables that are used to create the information 
asymmetry index variable can be found in Table A.1  
We start by creating variables that measure the relative divergence in answers between spouses on 
questions that asked about assets and other resources. For the variable loan, where respondents answered 
whether someone in the household had borrowed money from a person or institution, this divergence is 
just binary; either both spouses answered the same (=0), or not (=1). All other questions required to give 
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a certain positive number, such as the amount of land owned by the household. For those questions, the 
divergence in answers is divided by the average of the answers of both spouses. So:  
variable_average=(answer_husband+answer_wife)/2.  
dif_variable=(answer_husband-answer_wife)/variable_average.  
For some questions, instead of giving a numeric answer, one of the spouses responded that they did not 
know the answer. To prevent selection bias by deleting those respondents that answered “don’t know” to 
certain questions, we treated those responses of this couple as a binary difference, just as the loan variable. 
In our opinion, the benefit of keeping the information from those couples weighs up against calculating the 
information differences the exact same way.  
Table 5 gives an overview of the variables included in the index variable, that all capture the size of the 
difference in responses as given by husbands and wives.  
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics: Relative Differences in Reported Answers on Asset Variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
 N Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Bicycle 178 0.58 0.86 0 2 
Motorcycle 178 0.16 0.53 0 2 
Vehicle 178 0.013 0.15 0 2 
Tractor 178 0.015 0.16 0 2 
Ox plough 178 0.41 0.80 0 2 
Agricultural 
machinery 
178 0.80 0.95 0 2 
Solar panel 178 0.51 0.80 0 2 
Mobile phone 178 0.31 0.58 0 2 
Radio 178 0.62 0.88 0 2 
Land owned 178 0.66 0.53 0 2 
Land rented 178 0.92 0.84 0 2 
Crops grown* 178 3.97 2.08 0 11 
Maize seed 178 0.64 0.52 0 2 
Maize garden 178 0.65 0.55 0 2 
Maize yield 178 0.92 0.60 0 2 
Loan 178 0.35 0.48 0 1 
Large animal 
sold 
178 0.48 0.83 0 2 
Goat/sheep 
sold 
178 0.79 0.92 0 2 
Pigs sold 178 0.76 0.91 0 2 
Poultry sold 178 0.90 0.92 0 2 
N 178     
Notes: This table represents the variables that are included in the Information Asymmetry Index Variable. These 
variables report the absolute value of the difference in amount reported between spouses, divided by the average 
of the amounts reported by spouses on answers about questions on household assets and resources. Loan is the 
only variable that reports binary differences. Column 2 (Mean) reports the average relative difference, Column 3 
reports the standard deviation, Column 4 the minimum reported difference between answers of spouses, Column 





The final information asymmetry index variable consists of all relative difference variables. If the difference 
in responses between spouses is large, this implies a high level of information asymmetry between spouses. 
A large negative number implies a low level of information asymmetry.  
Because we wanted to capture the amount of information asymmetry between spouses as precisely as 
possible, we used all relevant questions about assets and resources from the questionnaire. Pooling the 
variables for the differences in responses into an index variable reduces the amount of tests performed 
and avoids issues with multiple hypotheses testing. There is no need for p-value adjustments, which would 
reduce the power of the test, while still allowing to add the desired variables without increasing the 
probability of a false rejection (Anderson, 2008). We create a continuous variable, to prevent having 
information asymmetry based on certain threshold levels.  
Measuring relative differences between answers has the advantage of providing relevant knowledge about 
the degree of spousal information asymmetry, while avoiding overestimating the amount of information 
asymmetry that would occur when measuring absolute differences in answers. This would give certain 
difference variables too much weight in the final information asymmetry index variable. Several other ways 
of measuring relative differences have the drawback that adding more questions implies a higher change 
of the occurrence of the response zero. There are a lot of different ways of dealing with zeros in regression 
models, such as explained by Bellégo & Pape (2019), each with its own downsides and advantages. We 
avoid this problem by dividing the divergence in answers between spouses by the average of the answers. 
4.2.3 Indicator definition difference between spousal risk preferences 
The risk preferences of the husband (RPH) and the wife (RPW) in the household will be explanatory 
variables in a model testing the relation between agricultural intensification by the household and spouse’s 
risk preferences. To measure the level of individual risk preference, we used the behaviour of husbands 
and wives in a Holt & Laury (2002) lottery. In the lottery, individuals were asked eight times to choose 
between bags with different beads, Option A and Option B, that represented chances to win a certain prize. 
They expected payoff can be seen in Table 6, figure A.1 shows the poster with the bags as used in the 
experiment. Each round, the chances of low or high prizes changed between the Option A and Option B 
bags, where Option A is the safe option and Option B is the risky option.  At a certain point, the individual 
is expected to switch from choosing A to choosing B, and this switch point is used as reference for the level 
of risk aversion.   
      Table 6: The lottery-choice decisions 
(1) (2) (3) 
   
Option A Option B Expected payoff 
difference 
0/8 chance of UGX 4,000, 8/8 
chance of UGX 3,200 
 
0/8 chance of UGX 7,700, 8/8 
chance of  UGX 200 
 
UGX  3,000 
1/8 chance of UGX 4,000, 7/8 
chance of UGX 3,200 
 
1/8 chance of UGX 7,700, 7/8 
chance of  UGX 200 
 
UGX  2,163 
2/8 chance of  UGX 4,000, 6/8 
chance of  UGX 3,200 
 
2/8 chance of  UGX 7,700, 6/8 
chance of  UGX 200 
 
UGX  1,325 
3/8 chance of  UGX 4,000, 5/8 
chance of  UGX 3,200 
 
3/8 chance of  UGX 7,700, 5/8 
chance of  UGX 200 
 
UGX     488 
4/8 chance of  UGX 4,000, 4/8 
chance of  UGX 3,200 
4/8 chance of  UGX 7,700, 4/8 
chance of  UGX 200 




5/8 chance of  UGX 4,000, 3/8 
chance of  UGX 3,200 
 
6/8 chance of  UGX 4,000, 2/8 
chance of  UGX 3,200 
 
7/8 chance of  UGX 4,000, 1/8 
chance of  UGX 3,200 
 
5/8 chance of  UGX 7,700, 3/8 
chance of  UGX 200 
 
6/8 chance of  UGX 7,700, 2/8 
chance of  UGX 200 
 
7/8 chance of  UGX 7,700, 1/8 








As in the first round the chance of winning UGX 3,200 when choosing option A is 8/8, and the chance of 
winning UGX 200 when choosing option B is 8/8, we expect all rational participants to choose option A. 
Risk-seeking (RS) subjects will switch to choose option B in rounds 2 to 4, and risk-neutral (RN) subjects 
will switch to option B in round 5. Risk-averse (RA) subjects will switch after round 5, or never switch, as 
round 8 still has a chance of 1/8 for the low pay-out. 
The first way of categorising husband’s and wives’ risk preferences, is by making 3 categories: RA subjects, 
RN subjects and RS subjects. We create dummy variables for risk preference categories RN and RA of both 
husband and wife, treating RS as reference category. A second way of categorising the risk preferences, 
is by using switch round. A low number of the switch round implies a RS subject, a high number of the 
switch round implies more risk aversion. However, not all subjects behave consistent in the lottery, as 
thirteen subjects switched back and forth between Option A and Option B. One individual already chose 
option B in the first round, with a 100% chance of a low pay-out. Because excluding these subjects would 
introduce selection bias, we create a fourth category for the risk inconsistent (RI) subjects in the first way 
of categorising risk preferences, and add a dummy variable for husband and wife. In the second part, 
where we use switch round as reference for the level of risk aversion, we treat the first time the subject 
switches to Option B as switch round.  
4.2.4 Household wealth and other control variables 
One important control variable is household wealth. Studies show that this is an important factor for 
technology adoption, because of the role that credit constraints and access to resources play in investments 
(Liu, 2019). Verschoor et al. (2016) use wealth as a control variable in the context of rural Uganda, which 
indeed shows statistically significance in all regressions. The household wealth control variable in our model 
is an index variable, consisting of variables for household assets. The questions from the questionnaire can 
be found in Table A.1.4, an overview of the variables can be found in Table 7. We measure household 
wealth by taking the averages as reported by the spouses. We also control for age and education, as these 
factors also influence agricultural investments (Verschoor et al., 2016). We use age of the husband and 
whether the husband has received at least some secondary education. Besides, we control for district fixed 
effects.  
Table 7: Descriptive statistics for household wealth control index variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
 N Mean St. dev Min Max 
Wall* 178 1.47 0.46 1 2 
Roof*  178 1.55 0.47 1 2 
Toilet* 178 2.35 0.49 1.50 4 
Bicycle 178 0.88 0.59 0 3.50 
Motorcycle 178 0.24 0.46 0 2.50 
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Vehicle 178 0.034 0.28 0 3.50 
Tractor 178 0.011 0.12 0 1.50 
Ox plough 178 0.18 0.46 0 4 
Agricultural 
machinery 
178 0.58 0.68 0 4 
Solar panel 178 0.76 0.59 0 3 
Mobile phone 178 1.51 1.33 0 8.50 
Radio 178 0.72 0.56 0 3 
Land size 176 5.01 8.88 0 83 
Large animals 178 1.34 2.75 0 27 
Goat/Sheep 178 1.79 2.30 0 15 
Pigs 178 1.31 5.92 0 78 
Poultry 178 10.3 13.9 0 155 
Cross-breed* 178 0.098 0.23 0 1 
Exotic* 178 0.062 0.17 0 1 
N 178     
Note: This table consists of variables that show information about household wealth, based on spousal average 
reported levels. Responses are in absolute numbers, answers for variables with a * are categorical.  
 
4.3 Model and estimation strategy 
4.3.1 Model 1 
To address the first research question about the relation between the extent of intrahousehold information 
asymmetry and investment in agricultural intensification, we will estimate the following model in the 
analysis, using simple OLS.  
 𝑦𝑖  =  𝛽0  + 𝛽1 𝑥𝑖 +  𝛽2{𝑋𝑖} + 𝛽3𝑑 +  𝜀𝑖 , 𝑖 =  1, . . . , 𝑛  
Where 𝑦𝑖  = the outcome variable indicating the level of household investments in agricultural 
intensification, and xi is an indicator for information asymmetry in the household. {𝑋}𝑖 is a vector of 
household level control variables {being age of the husband, secondary education husband and household 
wealth}, and  𝑑 is the variable for district fixed effects.  
We will run the regression three different ways. One with information on household investments in 
agricultural intensification as reported by women, one with data as reported by men, and one which 
combines both data. 
4.3.2 Model 2 
To address the second research question about the relation between individual risk preference and 
investment in agricultural intensification, we will estimate two similar models in the analysis, using simple 
ordinary least squares (OLS).  
𝑦𝑖  =  𝛽0  +  𝛽1 ℎ𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑤𝑖+𝛽3{𝑋𝑖} + 𝛽4𝑑 +  𝜀𝑖 , 𝑖 =  1, . . . , 𝑛  
Where 𝑦𝑖  = the outcome variable indicating the level of household investments in agricultural 
intensification, hi is an indicator for risk preference of the husband, and wi is an indicator for risk preference 
of the wife. {𝑋}𝑖 is a vector of household level control variables {being age of the husband, secondary 
education husband and household wealth}, and 𝑑 is the variable for district fixed effects.  
Similarly, we will estimate the models with the dependent variable based on women’s answers, on men’s 




We will first discuss the results of the analysis of the relationship between spousal information asymmetry 
and household investments in agricultural intensification. We will then discuss the relationship between 
individual risk preferences of spouses and household investments in agricultural intensification. 
5.1 Descriptive statistics of dependent and explanatory variables 
There are a few insights from the data that are interesting to highlight. On average, men report higher 
investments than women. Where men have an average investment index of 0.16, for women this is -0.16, 
implying that women report lower levels of investments. Men also report higher wealth levels than women, 
when comparing average wealth index levels by sex. While men have an average wealth index of .080, for 
women this index is -0.080, however this difference is not significant. On average, men are more risk-
averse than women as well, as they have a higher switch round number.  
Table 8: Descriptive Statistics Outcome and Explanatory Variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
 N Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Investment 
index average 
178 -2.7e-09 1.00 -2.27 2.79 
Investment 
index husbands 
178 0.16 1.02 -2.19 2.43 
Investment 
index wives 




178 4.1e-10 1.00 -2.65 3.45 
Switch round 
husband 
178 5.98 1.28 1 9 
Switch round 
wife 
178 5.70 1.19 2 9 
RN husband* 178 0.28 0.45 0 1 
RA husband* 178 0.66 0.48 0 1 
RI husband* 178 0.039 0.19 0 1 
RS husband* 178 0.062 0.24 0 1 
RN wife* 178 0.28 0.45 0 1 
RA wife* 178 0.61 0.49 0 1 
RI wife* 178 0.039 0.19 0 1 
RS wife* 178 0.11 0.32 0 1 
Wealth average 176 -0.47 1.00 -1.73 5.83 
Wealth 
husband 
178 0.080 0.99 -1.43 4.33 
Wealth wife 178 -0.080 1.01 -1.94 5.77 
Age husband 178 39.5 11.2 20 75 
Education 
husband 
178 0.37 0.48 0 1 
Note: This table contains descriptive statistics for outcome and explanatory variables. *Dummy variables 
 
5.2 Information Asymmetry and Agricultural Investments 
In Table 9 we represent the results for research question 1. We hypothesised that a greater degree of 
information asymmetry between spouses in the household would negatively correlate with household 
investments in agricultural intensification. We tested this using investment levels as reported by husbands, 
as reported by wives and based on spouses’ average reported levels. However, we see that the coefficient 
for the information asymmetry index is not statistically significant. Therefore, our results do not show 
enough proof to accept the hypothesis.  
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We control for robustness in multiple ways. First, we run regressions for investment level based on 
husbands’ reports and wives’ reports, while adapting the household wealth control variable. Instead of 
controlling with taking the average household wealth levels as reported by the spouses, we control by 
taking the levels based on husbands’ reports and based on wives’ reports. We see no major differences in 
results with Table 9. Regression results can be found in table A.2. A second robustness check changes the 
way the agricultural investment outcome variable is created. Instead of counting the number of 
investments made for the 5 most popular crops, we did regressions with a variable that counts investment 
made for all 22 crops asked about in the survey. Again, we see no significant relation between degree of 
information asymmetry between spouses and household investments in agricultural intensification. 
Regression results can be found in table A.3. The final robustness check changes the way the information 
asymmetry index is created. This time the summary variable is left out that measures the degree in 
different responses between spouses when asked for 22 crops whether the household has grown these 
crops, as this variable is created differently from the other variables in the index. We see no major 
differences in results with Table 9. Regression results can be found in table A.4. 
Table 9: OLS regression results for Hypothesis 1, outcome agricultural investment level 
 (1) (2) (3) 
  Investment level Investment level 
VARIABLES Investment level based on 
spouses’ average reports 
based on husbands’ 
reports  
based on wives’ 
reports 
    
Information asymmetry1 0.0696 0.0689 0.0481 
 (0.0626) (0.0717) (0.0613) 
Wealth1 0.132** 0.148** 0.0749 
 (0.0634) (0.0727) (0.0621) 
Age husband -0.00202 -0.00714 0.00367 
 (0.00540) (0.00620) (0.00529) 
Education husband 0.575*** 0.395*** 0.594*** 
 (0.125) (0.143) (0.122) 
District 1.051*** 0.797*** 0.993*** 
 (0.128) (0.146) (0.125) 
Constant -1.623*** -0.818** -1.950*** 
 (0.290) (0.332) (0.284) 
    
N 176 176 176 
R-squared 0.400 0.241 0.377 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
1Index variables 
 
5.3 Risk & Bargaining 
Table 10 presents the first part of the results for research question 2. We hypothesised that the husbands 
risk preference is taken more into account, and that being more risk averse is negatively correlated with 
household investments in agricultural intensification. We tested this using investment levels as reported 
by husbands, as reported by wives and based on spouses’ average reported levels. We used the four risk 
categories of husband and wife as key independent variables, creating dummy variables RA, RN and RI, 
treating RS as reference category. The results show no significant relationship between risk category 
husband and investments in agricultural intensification. To check for robustness, we used a variable for 
level of risk aversion (LRA) with option 1-4 instead of dummy variables. We see no major differences in 
results with Table 10. Regression results can be found in table A.5.  
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Table 10: OLS regression results for Hypothesis 2, Part 1, outcome agricultural investment level 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Investment level 
based on spouses’ 
average reports 
Investment level 
based on husbands’ 
reports 
Investment level 
based on wives’ 
reports 
    
RN husband1 0.120 0.154 0.0285 
 (0.291) (0.332) (0.286) 
RA husband1 0.0313 0.155 -0.113 
 (0.286) (0.326) (0.282) 
RI husband1 -0.460 -0.506 -0.259 
 (0.345) (0.393) (0.339) 
RN wife1 0.168 0.0414 0.257 
 (0.223) (0.255) (0.220) 
RA wife1 0.325 0.291 0.270 
 (0.210) (0.239) (0.206) 
RI wife1 0.111 -0.115 0.297 
 (0.335) (0.383) (0.330) 
Wealth2 0.143** 0.160** 0.0823 
 (0.0626) (0.0715) (0.0616) 
Age husband -0.00271 -0.00739 0.00293 
 (0.00568) (0.00648) (0.00559) 
Education husband 0.616*** 0.443*** 0.613*** 
 (0.128) (0.146) (0.126) 
District 1.035*** 0.789*** 0.975*** 
 (0.125) (0.143) (0.123) 
Constant -1.866*** -1.115** -2.069*** 
 (0.399) (0.455) (0.393) 
    
N 176 176 176 
R-squared 0.416 0.268 0.388 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
1Dummy variables. 2Index variable, based on spousal average reported household levels  
 
Table 11 presents the second part of the results for research question 2. We hypothesised that the 
husbands risk preference is taken more into account, and that being more risk averse is negatively 
correlated with household investments in agricultural intensification. We tested this using investment levels 
as reported by husbands, as reported by wives and based on spouses’ average reported levels. We used 
switch round husband and switch round spouse as key independent variables. From the 13 subjects that 
switch between option A and B, we took the first round that they switch as indicating switch round. The 
results show no significant relationship between switch round husband and investments in agricultural 
intensification. However, when we take investment level based on husbands’ reports, we see a positive 
relation between switch round wife and reported investments in agricultural intensification. The relation is 
significant at the 10% level, suggesting that wives’ risk preferences play a role in the decision to invest in 
agricultural intensification, although in a different way than expected. A higher switch round indicates being 
more risk averse, and we hypothesised that being risk averse is negatively correlated with household 
investments in agricultural intensification. We test for robustness by controlling for household wealth taking 
the levels based on husbands’ reports and based on wives’ reports, instead of controlling with the average 
household wealth levels as reported by the spouses. Regression results can be found in table A.6., and are 
quite similar to the results in Table 11. Switch round wife is again positively related to reported investments 
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in agricultural investments, when we take investment level based on husbands’ reports, with a significance 
level of 10%.  
Table 11: OLS regression results for Hypothesis 2, Part 2, outcome agricultural investment level 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Investment level based 
on spouses’ average 
reports 
Investment level based on 
husbands’ reports 
Investment level based 
on wives’ reports 
    
Switch round husband 0.0175 0.0715 -0.0430 
 (0.0465) (0.0527) (0.0456) 
Switch round wife 0.0646 0.101* 0.00861 
 (0.0498) (0.0565) (0.0488) 
Wealth1 0.152** 0.171** 0.0849 
 (0.0611) (0.0693) (0.0599) 
Age husband -0.000921 -0.00564 0.00404 
 (0.00544) (0.00617) (0.00534) 
Education Husband 0.603*** 0.443*** 0.591*** 
 (0.125) (0.142) (0.123) 
District 1.017*** 0.754*** 0.979*** 
 (0.124) (0.141) (0.122) 
Constant -2.090*** -1.825*** -1.730*** 
 (0.495) (0.561) (0.485) 
    
N 176 176 176 
R-squared 0.402 0.260 0.378 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
1Index variable, based on spousal average reported household levels  
 
 
6. Discussion & Conclusion 
While technology to improve agricultural productivity is available in many parts of Uganda, adoption levels 
are low. Because the adoption decision is made within the agrarian household, we wanted to contribute to 
the understanding of the decision-making process towards agricultural investments. The focus hereby was 
on the issue of information asymmetry between spouses, and the extent to which spousal risk preferences 
relate to the decision about investments in agricultural intensification. 
 
First, we investigated whether there is a correlation between information asymmetry between spouses, 
and the level of household investments in agricultural intensification. We hypothesised that more 
information asymmetry between husbands and wives is associated with less household investments in 
agricultural intensification. We used an index variable of household investments in agricultural 
intensification based on wives’ reports, husbands’ and based on spouses’ average reports as three 
alternative dependent variables. Information asymmetry between spouses was measured using an 
Anderson (2008) type of summary index, measuring information asymmetry using differences in responses 
on survey questions about household assets and other resources. We did not find a statistically significant 
relation between our indicator for information asymmetry and investments in agricultural intensification.  
 
An explanation from the literature on why we might not find a correlation between spousal information 
asymmetry and agricultural investments, comes from the study of Hoel (2015). While several studies 
19 
 
conclude that information asymmetry is among the main causes of inefficiency in the household, and that 
spouses behave opportunistically when information asymmetry is present in the household, the researcher 
questions this conclusion. Instead of an average treatment affect, this study looks at heterogeneous types, 
and finds that only a minority of spouses takes advantage of asymmetric information. According to Hoel 
(2015), the level of information sharing has different causes for different respondents. For some, 
information sharing is voluntary and for these spouses, a lack of information asymmetry is assumed to be 
positively correlated with cooperation. Conversely, for others, more information sharing probably indicates 
that there is close monitoring by one spouse, indicating a lack of trust. The design of this study did not 
allow to distinguish between different meanings to information asymmetry at home, but we do recommend 
further research to take this into account.  
The second part of the research looked at the extent and in what way household investments in agricultural 
intensification is related to husbands’ and wives’ preferences with regard to risk. We hypothesised that the 
husband’s preference is taken more into account in the agricultural investment decision, and that 
individuals that are more risk averse prefer to invest less in agricultural intensification. Individual risk 
preference of the husband (RPH) and the wife (RPW) were measured using individual behaviour in a Holt 
& Laury (2002) lottery. RPH and RPW were measured in two different ways. First, we created four risk 
categories, being Risk-Seeking (RS), Risk-Averse (RA), Risk-Neutral (RN) and Risk Inconsistent (RI) and 
added the last three as dummy variables to the model. We did not find a significant relationship between 
risk category husband and investments in agricultural intensification. Second, we used round of switching 
as an indicator for level of risk-aversion, and used husband’s and wife’s risk preference as independent 
variables. We did not find a significant relation between level of husband’s risk preference and investments 
in agricultural intensification. However, when taking investment level based on husbands’ reports, we see 
a positive relation between switch round of wives and reported investments in agricultural intensification. 
This relation is significant at the 10% level, also when tested for robustness. This suggests that wives’ risk 
preferences play a role in agricultural intensification, although the opposite way from expected, since a 
higher switch round indicating more risk aversion was hypothesised to be negatively correlated with 
agricultural investments.  
 
It is striking that wife’s risk preference is only significant when we use household investments in agricultural 
intensification as reported by husbands. Husbands report higher average levels of investments than wives, 
while wives are on average less risk averse than husbands. This could possibly indicate several things. 
First, while men are assumed to be the key decision-makers about investments in agriculture, it could be 
that wives have sufficient bargaining power to influence their spouses to make more investments. Another 
possibility is that if it is true that men have most influence on the decision about investments in agriculture, 
this could indicate that risk preferences in the Holt Laury lottery do not reflect real-life preferences for 
investing in agricultural intensification under risk.  
 
When consulting the literature about the relation between risk preferences and investment decisions, a 
first difference with our results is that in most studies with experimentally measured levels of risk aversion, 
women are more risk averse than men. However, studies differ a lot in their tasks, making it complicated 
to make meaningful comparisons of results (Eckel & Grossman, 2008). While our study only measured risk 
aversion levels from a Holt Laury lottery in the gains domain, other studies also measure risk aversion 
levels from a loss domain, which could lead to different results. There is also discussion whether abstract 
experiments such as Holt Laury lotteries reflect real-life decision-making. Studies that measure risk 
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aversion levels in experiments with contextual frames do not have decisive conclusions about which gender 
is more risk-averse (Eckel & Grossman, 2008).  
 
One limitation of this study is the small sample size, which only contains 178 households, which might be 
not big enough to reveal the correlation. Another limitation when creating the dependent variable was that 
we used answers on questions about whether the household had made certain investments. Answer 
categories were binary, and if individuals indicated they made a certain invested, this increased their level 
of investments in agricultural intensification. However, survey questions did not ask about the size of the 
investments. If a household has responded it has hired labour for multiple crops, this might be for a smaller 
plot of land than when someone has hired labour for one crop on a very big plot of land. However, the first 
respondent has a higher number for the investment index variable. A further issue with the dependent 
variable, is that spouses report different levels of investments. This raises the question whose answers are 
closest to the true investment level, and could mean that differences in reported investment levels are due 
to information asymmetry about investments as well. We tried to take this into account by only using 
husband’s data or wives’ data in the regressions, but this might still be of influence to the regression 
results. An example is that with the second hypothesis and switch round as explanatory variable, wife’s 
risk preference is only significantly related when using  household investments in agricultural intensification 
as reported by husbands. 
 
This study took a new approach in trying to better understand the decision-making process about investing 
in agricultural intensification. While our results do not show a significant relation between information 
asymmetry and investments in agricultural intensification, we do recommend further research to be done 
about this relation. The meaning attributed to spousal information asymmetry still requires better 
understanding, whereby we recommend researchers to take into account that a lack of information 
asymmetry between husband and wife can either be voluntary, or due to close monitoring by the spouse.  
We further recommend to study the relationship between household investments in agricultural 
intensification and husbands’ and wives’ risk preferences by measuring risk aversion levels from a loss 
domain. Besides, we recommend this relation to be studied measuring spousal risk preferences in an 
experiment using contextual frames, to better represent the real-life decision of investing in agriculture 
under risk. Furthermore, researchers should complement experimental studies with results from other 
disciplines such as anthropology, in order to better understand the decision-making process towards 
agricultural investments. We recommend to pay attention especially to the role of bargaining that takes 
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A.1 Indicator Details 
A.1.1  Outcome indicator of level of household investments in agricultural intensification 
Investment intensification index variable consists of variables based on answers to the following 
questions: 
Part 1 
• Has your household invested in growing new crops in the past 5 years? 
• Has your household invested in buying livestock in the past 5 years? 
• Has your household invested in getting a loan for agricultural purposes in the past 5 years? 
• Has your household invested in irrigation in the past 5 years? 
• Has your household invested in storage facilities in the past 5 years? 
• Has your household invested in means of transportation of agricultural produce in the past 5 years? 
• Has your household invested in improving land (for agriculture) in the past 5 years? 
• Has your household invested in buying land (for agriculture) in the past 5 years? 
• Has your household invested in hiring labour (for agriculture) in the past 5 years? 
• Has your household invested in hiring equipment (for agriculture) in the past 5 years? 
• Has your household invested in purchasing improved quality seed from shops in the past 5 years? 
• Has your household invested in purchasing fertilizer in the past 5 years? 




All these questions are about the last two completed cropping seasons, which is 2019A (Jan - June) and 
2018B (July -Dec). By “completed” I mean that the harvest was finished at least two months ago. In 
either of these two cropping seasons (so in at least one of them) ... 
• Did your household grow maize? 
If yes, 
• Did your household purchase improved maize seed/seedlings? 
• Did your household use fertilizer when growing maize? 
• Did your household use pesticides when growing maize? 
• Did your household hire labour for growing maize? 
 
• Did your household grow beans? 
If yes,  
• Did your household purchase improved beans seed/seedlings? 
• Did your household use fertilizer when growing beans? 
• Did your household use pesticides when growing beans? 
• Did your household hire labour for growing beans? 
 
• Did your household grow cassava? 
If yes,  
• Did your household purchase improved cassava seed/seedlings? 
• Did your household use fertilizer when growing cassava? 
• Did your household use pesticides when growing cassava? 
• Did your household hire labour for growing cassava? 
 
• Did your household grow groundnuts? 
If yes, 
• Did your household purchase improved groundnut seed/seedlings? 
• Did your household use fertilizer when growing groundnuts? 
• Did your household use pesticides when growing groundnuts? 




• Did your household grow sweet potato? 
If yes,  
• Did your household purchase improved sweet potato seed/seedlings? 
• Did your household use fertilizer when growing sweet potato? 
• Did your household use pesticides when growing sweet potato? 
• Did your household hire labour for growing sweet potato? 
 
Part 3 
Which Maize Variety (or varieties) did you plant in 2019A (March to June)?  
1 VP Max  
2 Longe1  
3 Longe4  
4 Longe5  
5 Super  
6 FH500S  
7 FH5055  
8 FH5160  
9 FH6150  
10 Victoria 1  
11 Victoria 2  
12 UH5051  
13 UH5052/PH5052  
14 UH5053  
15 UH5355/PH 5355  
16 UH5402  
17 UH5354/ Bazooka (double cobber)  
18 Longe11H  
19 Longe10H  
20 Longe9H  
21 Longe8H  
22 Longe7H  
23 Longe6H  
24 Yara41  
25 Yara42  
26 H614  
27 H629  
28 DH06  
29 DH04  
30 H520  
31 H624  
32 Pan67  
33 Pan15  
34 Ahadi /W1101  
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35 WE2106  
36 WE2115  
37 WE3106  
777 Seed variety name not mentioned in the list  
39 Local seed/traditional seed(if Farmer doesn’t know the name)  
40 Hybrid(if Farmer doesn’t know the name)  
999 None(Did not plant in 2019)  
 
Categorised into:  
- Hybrids (2 points) 
- OPV (1 point) 
- Local (0 points) 
 
• Do you use strings/ropes when planting maize 
1= Yes 
0=No 




A.1.2 Information asymmetry index variable 
 
Information asymmetry variable consists of divergence variables based on answers to the following 
questions: 
• How many bicycles does your household own? 
• How many motorcycles does your household own? 
• How many cars, vans, trucks/lorries does your household own? 
• How many tractors does your household own? 
• How many ox ploughs without oxen does your household own? 
• How many (hand) threshers, (hand) mills, insecticide spray pumps does your household own? 
• How many solar panels does your household own? 
• How many mobile phones does your household own? 
• How many radios does your household own? 
• What is the total size of the land owned by your household?  
• In the last 12 months (season 2019 A and 2018B), how much land did you rent in for 
cultivating?  
• Which crops did your household grow? (asked about the last two completed cropping seasons, 
which is 2019A (March to June) and 2018B (August to December). Did you grow (Yes/no): 
1. Maize  
2. Beans  
3. Matooke  
4. Cassava  
5. Ground nuts  
6. Rice  
7. Soy bean  
8. Sorghum  
9. Millet  
10. Sweet potato  
11. Peas  
12. Yam  
13. Irish Potato  
14. Coffee  
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15. Sunflower  
16. Cotton  
17. Onion  
18. Tomato  
19. Cabbage  
20. Egg plant  
21. Avocado  
22. Sweet bananas  
 
• How many kilograms of maize seed did you use?  
• What was the size of the maize garden? 
• How many kg was the yield of the maize?  
• Did you or somebody in your household borrow money from any person or institution in the past 
2 years? 
• How many of the following livestock did you sell in the last 12 months? 
• How many heifers and cows, bulls and oxen, calves, donkeys, other large animals did you sell in 
the last 12 months? 
• How many goats, sheep did you sell in the last 12 months? 
• How many pigs (not including piglets) did you sell in the last 12 months? 
• How many poultry did you sell in the last 12 months? 
   
Table A.1 Descriptive statistics: Variables used to create Information Asymmetry index 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
 N Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Bicycle 356 0.88 0.68 0 4 
Motorcycle 356 0.24 0.50 0 4 
Vehicle 356 0.034 0.29 0 4 
Tractor 356 0.011 0.13 0 2 
Ox plough 356 0.18 0.62 0 8 
Agricultural 
machinery 
356 0.58 0.77 0 4 
Solar panel 356 0.76 0.68 0 4 
Mobile phone 356 1.51 1.39 0 10 
Radio 356 0.72 0.66 0 4 
Land owned 354 5.16 10.4 0 116 
Land rented 353 1.45 2.08 0 15 
Maize* 356 0.97 0.17 0 1 
Beans* 356 0.87 0.34 0 1 
Matooke* 356 0.33 0.47 0 1 
Cassava* 356 0.71 0.46 0 1 
Ground nuts* 356 0.55 0.50 0 1 
Rice* 356 0.13 0.33 0 1 
Soy bean*  356 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Sorghum* 356 0.33 0.47 0 1 
Millet* 356 0.37 0.48 0 1 
Sweet Potato* 356 0.89 0.32 0 1 
Peas* 356 0.31 0.46 0 1 
Yam* 356 0.12 0.33 0 1 
Irish potato* 356 0.12 0.33 0 1 
Coffee* 356 0.20 0.40 0 1 
Sunflower* 356 0.17 0.37 0 1 
Cotton* 356 0.070 0.26 0 1 
Onion* 356 0.059 0.24 0 1 
Tomato*  356 0.15 0.36 0 1 
Cabbage* 356 0.034 0.18 0 1 
Eggplant* 356 0.29 0.46 0 1 
Avocado* 356 0.19 0.39 0 1 
Sweet banana* 356 0.31 0.46 0 1 
Maize seed 348 14.1 22.8 0 220 
Maize garden 355 1.92 2.78 0 32 
Maize yield 351 1529.8 3726.6 0 37880 
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Loan* 356 0.71 0.46 0 1 
Large animal 
sold 
356 0.44 1.86 0 30 
Goat/sheep 
sold 
356 1.21 3.85 0 60 
Pigs sold 356 1.75 15.3 0 280 
Poultry sold 355 3.47 21.5 0 400 
N 356     
Notes: This table represents the variables that are used to build up the Information Asymmetry Index Variable. 
Responses are given by individuals, the index is created for couples (N=178).  Numbers reported are in absolute 
numbers. Variables with * are binary variables.  
 
A.1.3 Indicator definition difference between spousal risk preferences 
 
Figure A.2: Holt Laury Lottery Posters 
A.1.4 Household wealth control variable 
 
Household Wealth index variable is based on answers to the following questions: 
• What type of material is mainly used for construction of the wall of the house/dwelling? 
1. Unburnt bricks with mud, mud and sticks/poles and others 
2. Burnt bricks with cement, wood, tin/iron sheets, concrete/stones, stabilized bricks, or concrete 
 
• What type of material is mainly used for construction of the roof of the house/dwelling?  
1. Thatch, or tins 
2. Iron sheets, concrete, tiles, asbestos, or others 
 
• What type of toilet facility does the household mainly use? 
1. No facility, bush, polythene bags, bucket and other 
2. Uncovered pit latrine (with or without slab), Ecosan (compost toilet), covered pit latrine without slab 
3. Covered pit latrine with slab 
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4. VIP Latrine or flush toilet 
 
• How many bicycles does your household own? 
• How many motorcycles does your household own? 
• How many cars, vans, trucks/lorries does your household own? 
• How many tractors does your household own? 
• How many ox ploughs without oxen does your household own? 
• How many (hand) threshers, (hand) mills, insecticide spray pumps does your household own? 
• How many solar panels does your household own? 
• How many mobile phones does your household own? 
• How many radios does your household own? 
• What is the total size of the land owned by your household?  
• How many Heifer and Cows, Bulls and Oxen, Calves, Donkeys, Other large animals are owned by 
your household now? (present at the farm or elsewhere) 
• How many goats and sheep are owned by your household now? (present at the farm or 
elsewhere) 
• How many pigs (not including piglets) are owned by your household now? (present at the farm 
or elsewhere) 
• How many poultry are owned by your household now? (present at the farm or elsewhere) 
 
• Do you own any exotic animals? 
1=Yes, 0=no 
 




A.2 Robustness Checks 
A.2.1 Research Question 1 
 
Robustness check 1 
Table A.2: Robustness check 1 for Hypothesis 1, outcome agricultural investment level 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Investment level based on 
husbands' reports 
Investment level based on 
wives' reports 
   
Information asymmetry1 0.0474 0.0534 
 (0.0661) (0.0583) 
Wealth12 0.355*** 0.121** 
 (0.0695) (0.0593) 
Age husband -0.0117** 0.00259 




 (0.136) (0.122) 
District 0.736*** 0.993*** 
 (0.135) (0.120) 
Constant -0.601* -1.917*** 
 (0.309) (0.277) 
   
N 178 178 
R-squared 0.339 0.397 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: 1Index variables. 2Control variable household wealth measured based on husbands’ reported 
levels (column 1) and wives’ reported levels (column 2) 
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Robustness check 2 
Table A.3: Robustness check 2 for Hypothesis 1, outcome agricultural investment level (adapted) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Investment level based on 
spouses’ average reports 
Investment level 
based on husbands' 
reports 
Investment level 
based on wives’ 
reports 
    
    
Information 
asymmetry1 
0.0926 0.0890 0.0652 
 (0.0643) (0.0745) (0.0606) 
Wealth1 0.138** 0.164** 0.0709 
 (0.0652) (0.0755) (0.0615) 
Age husband -0.00305 -0.00986 0.00467 
 (0.00556) (0.00643) (0.00524) 
Education husband 0.592*** 0.383** 0.624*** 
 (0.128) (0.149) (0.121) 
District 0.938*** 0.656*** 0.915*** 
 (0.131) (0.152) (0.124) 
Constant -1.422*** -0.488 -1.896*** 
 (0.298) (0.345) (0.281) 
    
N 176 176 176 
R-squared 0.357 0.198 0.361 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Robustness check with adapted outcome variable.  1Index variables.  
Robustness check 3 
Table A.4: Robustness check 3 for Hypothesis 1, outcome agricultural investment level  
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Investment level based on 
spouses’ average reports 
Investment level based on 
husbands' reports 
Investment level based 
on wives' reports 
    
Information 
asymmetry1 
0.0447 0.0198 0.0545 
 (0.0630) (0.0723) (0.0616) 
Wealth1 0.138** 0.162** 0.0721 
 (0.0640) (0.0733) (0.0625) 
Age husband -0.00188 -0.00691 0.00369 
 (0.00541) (0.00621) (0.00529) 
Education 
husband 
0.582*** 0.404*** 0.596*** 
 (0.125) (0.143) (0.122) 
District 1.039*** 0.770*** 0.998*** 
 (0.129) (0.147) (0.126) 
Constant -1.610*** -0.785** -1.960*** 
 (0.291) (0.334) (0.285) 
    
N 176 176 176 
R-squared 0.397 0.237 0.378 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 





A.2.2 Research Question 2 
 
Robustness Check Part 1 
 
Table A.5: Robustness check for Part 1 of Hypothesis 2, outcome agricultural investment level 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Investment level based on 
spouses’ average reports 
Investment level 
based on husbands’ 
reports 
Investment level based 
on wives’ reports 
    
LRA Husband -0.0937 -0.0551 -0.0999 
 (0.0980) (0.113) (0.0959) 
LRA Wife 0.123 0.108 0.101 
 (0.0848) (0.0975) (0.0830) 
Wealth1 0.140** 0.160** 0.0769 
 (0.0615) (0.0708) (0.0602) 
Age husband -0.00205 -0.00708 0.00357 
 (0.00539) (0.00620) (0.00528) 
Education 
husband 
0.619*** 0.431*** 0.631*** 
 (0.126) (0.145) (0.123) 
District 1.031*** 0.774*** 0.981*** 
 (0.123) (0.142) (0.121) 
Constant -1.671*** -0.926* -1.933*** 
 (0.440) (0.506) (0.430) 
    
N 176 176 176 
R-squared 0.405 0.243 0.383 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
1Index variable, household wealth based on spouses’ average reported levels 
 
 
Robustness check Part 2 
 
Table A.6: OLS regression results for Part 2 Hypothesis 2, outcome agricultural investment level 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Investment level based on 
husbands’ reports 
Investment level based on 
wives’ reports 
   
Switch round husband 0.0813 -0.0531 
 (0.0492) (0.0448) 
Switch round wife 0.0938* 0.0155 
 (0.0532) (0.0483) 
Wealth1 0.363*** 0.131** 
 (0.0674) (0.0592) 
Age husband -0.0104* 0.00290 
 (0.00586) (0.00531) 
Education husband 0.347** 0.563*** 
 (0.135) (0.122) 
District 0.703*** 0.982*** 
 (0.131) (0.118) 
Constant -1.640*** -1.682*** 
 (0.527) (0.479) 
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N 178 178 
R-squared 0.360 0.399 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 




A.3 Stata codes 
 
A.3.1 Create information asymmetry variable 
version 13 
/* 
Thesis Leonie Schenkel 
Household analysis 
Data from PROMO project LIB 
File to create Information asymmetry variable  
Created On  2020-05-22 
Last Modified 2020-10-15 
*/ 
 
set more off 
use "C:\Users\Gebruiker\Dropbox\PROMO LIF data analysis\Data\Clean\LIF for analysis_13.dta",clear 
log using "C:\Users\Gebruiker\Dropbox\PROMO LIF data analysis\Do files\03 HH analysis\Information 
asymmetry index variable.smcl", replace 
 
//////////////////////////\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 
/////// Step 0: DATA CLEANING Household Analysis \\\\\\\\\\\\ 
//////////////////////////\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 
///*Drop variables that I don't need\\\ 
*Time of the session 
drop begin_dur begin_time sec_b_dur sec_b_time sec_c_dur sec_c_time start_sec_d_dur 
start_sec_d_time sec_d_dur sec_d_time starttime endtime reason_reject capable sec_c_dur1 
sec_d_dur1 ques_only_dur 
*Investment exercise 
drop opt list_frame frame_label frame_value b1_kg b1_draw b2_kg b2_draw b3 b4 b5 b6 b7 b16 





drop exercise_1 exercise_2 round_a round_b answer_opta answer_optb answer roundname_a 
roundname_b exercise roundname bead face payout total_payout  
*hhtype (drop to prevent confusion, only needed for game - use d2) 
drop hhtype  
 
///*Select only paired respondents\\\ 
drop if paired==. 
*(116 observations deleted) 
drop if paired==0 
*(120 observations deleted) 
*check for balance between districts 
tab district paired 
*190 respondent=95 couples in Dokolo, 166 respondents=83 couples in Masindi 
///*Order data\\\ 
order d3, after (d2_label) 
order resp_id, after (list_village) 
order pair_id, after (resp_id)  
order minID maxID n couple_id hh_id, after (spouse_id) 
////////////////////////\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 
///////////                         \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 
///////////  Information asymmetry  \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 









replace spouse_id2=1 if spouse_id==2 
replace spouse_id2=2 if spouse_id==1  




//* STEP 2: CREATE VARIABLES FOR THE DIFFERENCES \\ 
////////////////////////\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 
//////////////////\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 
//////////  D14 Assets  \\\\\\\\\\\\ 
//////////////////\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 
*1: Bicycle 
sort couple_id resp_id  
by couple_id: gen d141_spouse=d141[spouse_id2] 
by couple_id: gen d141_average=(d141+d141_spouse)/2 
generate dif_bicycle=. 
foreach v of varlist d141 d141_spouse { 
       bysort minID maxID: replace dif_bicycle  =  (d141-d141_spouse)/d141_average 
} 
replace dif_bicycle=0 if d141==0 & d141_spouse==0 




sort couple_id resp_id  
by couple_id: gen d142_spouse=d142[spouse_id2] 
by couple_id: gen d142_average=(d142+d142_spouse)/2 
generate dif_motorcycle=. 
foreach v of varlist d142 d142_spouse { 
       bysort minID maxID: replace dif_motorcycle  =  (d142-d142_spouse)/d142_average 
} 
replace dif_motorcycle=0 if d142==0 & d142_spouse==0 
*3: Large Vehicle (Car, Van, Truck/Lorry) 
sort couple_id resp_id  
by couple_id: gen d143_spouse=d143[spouse_id2] 
by couple_id: gen d143_average=(d143+d143_spouse)/2 
generate dif_vehicle=. 
foreach v of varlist d143 d143_spouse { 




replace dif_vehicle=0 if d143==0 & d143_spouse==0 
*4: Tractor 
sort couple_id resp_id  
by couple_id: gen d144_spouse=d144[spouse_id2] 
by couple_id: gen d144_average=(d144+d144_spouse)/2 
generate dif_tractor=. 
foreach v of varlist d144 d144_spouse { 
       bysort minID maxID: replace dif_tractor  =  (d144-d144_spouse)/d144_average 
} 
replace dif_tractor=0 if d144==0 & d144_spouse==0 
*6: Ox plough without oxen 
sort couple_id resp_id  
by couple_id: gen d146_spouse=d146[spouse_id2] 
by couple_id: gen d146_average=(d146+d146_spouse)/2 
generate dif_oxplough=. 
foreach v of varlist d146 d146_spouse { 
       bysort minID maxID: replace dif_oxplough  =  (d146-d146_spouse)/d146_average 
} 
replace dif_oxplough=0 if d146==0 & d146_spouse==0 
*7: Agricultural machinery ((hand) thresher, (hand) mill, insecticide spray pumps) 
sort couple_id resp_id  
by couple_id: gen d147_spouse=d147[spouse_id2] 
by couple_id: gen d147_average=(d147+d147_spouse)/2 
generate dif_agrmachinery=. 
foreach v of varlist d147 d147_spouse { 
       bysort minID maxID: replace dif_agrmachinery  =  (d147-d147_spouse)/d147_average 
} 
replace dif_agrmachinery=0 if d147==0 & d147_spouse==0 
*8: Solar panel 
sort couple_id resp_id  
by couple_id: gen d148_spouse=d148[spouse_id2] 





foreach v of varlist d148 d148_spouse { 
       bysort minID maxID: replace dif_solarpanel  =  (d148-d148_spouse)/d148_average 
} 
replace dif_solarpanel=0 if d148==0 & d148_spouse==0 
*9: Mobile phones 
sort couple_id resp_id  
by couple_id: gen d149_spouse=d149[spouse_id2] 
by couple_id: gen d149_average=(d149+d149_spouse)/2 
generate dif_mobphone=. 
foreach v of varlist d149 d149_spouse { 
       bysort minID maxID: replace dif_mobphone  =  (d149-d149_spouse)/d149_average 
} 
replace dif_mobphone=0 if d149==0 & d149_spouse==0 
*10: Radio 
sort couple_id resp_id  
by couple_id: gen d1410_spouse=d1410[spouse_id2] 
by couple_id: gen d1410_average=(d1410+d1410_spouse)/2 
 
generate dif_radio=. 
foreach v of varlist d1410 d1410_spouse { 
       bysort minID maxID: replace dif_radio  =  (d1410-d1410_spouse)/d1410_average 
} 
 




//////////  D15 Land owned  \\\\\\\\\\\\ 
////////////////////\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 
gen dif_landowned=. 
sort couple_id resp_id spouse_id 
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by couple_id: gen d15_spouse=d15[spouse_id2] 
by couple_id: gen d15_average=(d15+d15_spouse)/2 
foreach v of varlist d15 d15_spouse { 
       bysort minID maxID: replace dif_landowned  =  (d15-d15_spouse)/d15_average 
}     
replace dif_landowned=0 if d15==0 & d15_spouse==0 
br resp_id d15 d15_spouse d15_average dif_landowned if dif_landowned==. // 2 couples where 1 
spouse answers: don't know 
foreach v of varlist d15{ 
       bysort minID maxID: replace dif_landowned =  `v'[1] != `v'[2] if dif_landowned==. 
} 
////////////////////\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 
////////// D18 Land Rented in \\\\\\\\\\ 
////////////////////\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 
gen dif_landrented=. 
sort couple_id resp_id spouse_id 
by couple_id: gen d18_spouse=d18[spouse_id2] 
by couple_id: gen d18_average=(d18+d18_spouse)/2 
foreach v of varlist d18 d18_spouse { 
       bysort minID maxID: replace dif_landrented  =  (d18-d18_spouse)/d18_average 
} 
replace dif_landrented=0 if d18==0 & d18_spouse==0 
br resp_id d18 d18_spouse d18_average dif_landrented if dif_landrented==. // 3 couples where 1 
spouse answers: don't know 
foreach v of varlist d18{ 
       bysort minID maxID: replace dif_landrented =  `v'[1] != `v'[2] if dif_landrented==. 
} 
//////////////////\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 
//////////// D20 CROPS \\\\\\\\\\\\ 
//////////////////\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 
*1: Maize 
gen dif_cr_maize = . 
sort resp_id 
foreach v of varlist d20_1 { 
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       bysort minID maxID: replace dif_cr_maize =  `v'[1] != `v'[2] 
} 
order dif_cr_maize, after (d20_1) 
*2: Beans 
gen dif_cr_beans = . 
sort resp_id 
 
foreach v of varlist d20_2 { 
       bysort minID maxID: replace dif_cr_beans =  `v'[1] != `v'[2] 
} 
order dif_cr_beans, after (d20_2) 
 
*3: Matooke 
gen dif_cr_matooke = . 
sort resp_id 
foreach v of varlist d20_3 { 
       bysort minID maxID: replace dif_cr_matooke   =  `v'[1] != `v'[2] 
} 
order dif_cr_matooke , after (d20_3) 
*4: Cassava 
gen dif_cr_cassava= . 
sort resp_id 
foreach v of varlist d20_4 { 
       bysort minID maxID: replace dif_cr_cassava   =  `v'[1] != `v'[2] 
} 
order dif_cr_cassava , after (d20_4) 
*5 Groundnuts 
gen dif_cr_gnuts= . 
sort resp_id 
foreach v of varlist d20_5 { 





order dif_cr_gnuts, after (d20_5) 
*6 Rice 
gen dif_cr_rice= . 
sort resp_id 
foreach v of varlist d20_6{ 
       bysort minID maxID: replace dif_cr_rice   =  `v'[1] != `v'[2] 
} 
 
order dif_cr_rice, after (d20_6) 
*7 Soy bean 
gen dif_cr_soy= . 
sort resp_id 
foreach v of varlist d20_7 { 
       bysort minID maxID: replace dif_cr_soy   =  `v'[1] != `v'[2] 
} 
order dif_cr_soy, after (d20_7) 
*8 Sorghum 
gen dif_cr_sorghum= . 
sort resp_id 
foreach v of varlist d20_8 { 
       bysort minID maxID: replace dif_cr_sorghum  =  `v'[1] != `v'[2] 
} 
order dif_cr_sorghum, after (d20_8) 
*9 Millet 
gen dif_cr_millet= . 
sort resp_id 
foreach v of varlist d20_9 { 
       bysort minID maxID: replace dif_cr_millet  =  `v'[1] != `v'[2] 
} 
order dif_cr_millet, after (d20_9) 
*10 Sweet Potato 





foreach v of varlist d20_10 { 
       bysort minID maxID: replace dif_cr_sweetpot  =  `v'[1] != `v'[2] 
} 
order dif_cr_sweetpot, after (d20_10) 
*11: Peas 
gen dif_cr_peas = . 
sort resp_id 
foreach v of varlist d20_11 { 
       bysort minID maxID: replace dif_cr_peas =  `v'[1] != `v'[2] 
} 
order dif_cr_peas, after (d20_11) 
*12: Yam 
gen dif_cr_yam = . 
sort resp_id 
foreach v of varlist d20_12 { 
       bysort minID maxID: replace dif_cr_yam  =  `v'[1] != `v'[2] 
} 
 
order dif_cr_yam, after (d20_12) 
*13: Irish Potato 
gen dif_cr_Irish = . 
sort resp_id 
foreach v of varlist d20_13 { 
       bysort minID maxID: replace dif_cr_Irish  =  `v'[1] != `v'[2] 
} 
order dif_cr_Irish , after (d20_13) 
*14: Coffee 
gen dif_cr_coffee= . 
sort resp_id 
 
foreach v of varlist d20_14 { 




order dif_cr_coffee, after (d20_14) 
*15 Sunflower 
gen dif_cr_sunfl= . 
sort resp_id 
foreach v of varlist d20_15 { 
       bysort minID maxID: replace dif_cr_sunfl   =  `v'[1] != `v'[2] 
} 
order dif_cr_sunfl, after (d20_15) 
 
*16 Cotton 
gen dif_cr_cotton= . 
sort resp_id 
foreach v of varlist d20_16{ 
       bysort minID maxID: replace dif_cr_cotton   =  `v'[1] != `v'[2] 
} 
order dif_cr_cotton, after (d20_16) 
*17 Onion 
gen dif_cr_onion= . 
sort resp_id 
foreach v of varlist d20_17 { 
       bysort minID maxID: replace dif_cr_onion   =  `v'[1] != `v'[2] 
} 
order dif_cr_onion, after (d20_7) 
*18 Tomato 
gen dif_cr_tomato= . 
sort resp_id 
 
foreach v of varlist d20_18 { 
       bysort minID maxID: replace dif_cr_tomato =  `v'[1] != `v'[2] 
} 




gen dif_cr_cabbage= . 
sort resp_id 
 
foreach v of varlist d20_19 { 
       bysort minID maxID: replace dif_cr_cabbage  =  `v'[1] != `v'[2] 
} 
order dif_cr_cabbage, after (d20_19) 
*20 Egg plant 
gen dif_cr_eggpl= . 
sort resp_id 
foreach v of varlist d20_20 { 
       bysort minID maxID: replace dif_cr_eggpl  =  `v'[1] != `v'[2] 
} 
order dif_cr_eggpl, after (d20_20) 
 
*21 Avocado 
gen dif_cr_avocado= . 
sort resp_id 
 
foreach v of varlist d20_21 { 
       bysort minID maxID: replace dif_cr_avocado  =  `v'[1] != `v'[2] 
} 
order dif_cr_avocado, after (d20_21) 
*22 Sweet bananas 
gen dif_cr_swbanana= . 
sort resp_id 
 
foreach v of varlist d20_22 { 
       bysort minID maxID: replace dif_cr_swbanana =  `v'[1] != `v'[2] 
} 
 








//Measures how many knowledge they have about the crops the household/spouse grows 
 
//// D30 Kg of Maize Seed \\\\ 
replace d30=0 if d20_1==0 // Missing variables because those individuals answered that their household 
doesn't grow maize. 10 individuals responded they don't grow maize. 
gen dif_maizeseed=. 
sort couple_id resp_id spouse_id 
by couple_id: gen d30_spouse=d30[spouse_id2] 
by couple_id: gen d30_average=(d30+d30_spouse)/2 
 
foreach v of varlist d30 d30_spouse { 
       bysort minID maxID: replace dif_maizeseed =  (d30-d30_spouse)/d30_average 
} 
replace dif_maizeseed=0 if d30==0 & d30_spouse==0 
br resp_id pair_id  couple_id spouse_id spouse_id2 minID d30 d30_spouse dif_maizeseed if 
dif_maizeseed==. //8 individuals responded .b (don't know) at d30 
foreach v of varlist d30 { 




/////  D31 Size Maize Garden \\\\\\\ 
//////////////////\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 
replace d31=0 if d20_1==0 
gen dif_maizegarden=. 
sort couple_id resp_id spouse_id 
by couple_id: gen d31_spouse=d31[spouse_id2] 
by couple_id: gen d31_average=(d31+d31_spouse)/2 
 
foreach v of varlist d31 d31_spouse { 




replace dif_maizegarden=0 if d31==0 & d31_spouse==0 
br resp_id pair_id  couple_id spouse_id spouse_id2 minID d31 d31_spouse dif_maizegarden d20_1 if 
dif_maizegarden==. // 1 individual responded .b at d31  
 
foreach v of varlist d31{ 
       bysort minID maxID: replace dif_maizegarden=  `v'[1] != `v'[2] if dif_maizegarden==. 
} 
 
//// D32 Maize Yield \\\\ 
replace d32=0 if d20_1==0 // Missing variables because those individuals answered that their household 
doesn't grow maize 
gen dif_maizeyield=. 
sort couple_id resp_id spouse_id 
by couple_id: gen d32_spouse=d32[spouse_id2] 
by couple_id: gen d32_average=(d32+d32_spouse)/2 
 
foreach v of varlist d32 d32_spouse { 
       bysort minID maxID: replace dif_maizeyield =  (d32-d32_spouse)/d32_average 
} 
replace dif_maizeyield=0 if d32==0 & d32_spouse==0 
br resp_id pair_id  couple_id spouse_id spouse_id2 minID  d20_1 d32 d32_spouse dif_maizeyield if 
dif_maizeyield==. // 5 individuals responded .b at d32  
 
foreach v of varlist d32 { 
       bysort minID maxID: replace dif_maizeyield   =  `v'[1] != `v'[2] if dif_maizeyield==. 
} 
 
//// D57 Loan \\\\ 
gen dif_loan = . 
sort resp_id 
foreach v of varlist d57 { 
       bysort minID maxID: replace dif_loan  =  `v'[1] != `v'[2] 
} 
/// D72 Animals sold\\\\ 
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*1: Large animals 
sort couple_id resp_id  
by couple_id: gen d72_1_spouse=d72_1[spouse_id2] 
by couple_id: gen d72_1_average=(d72_1+d72_1_spouse)/2 
gen dif_animlarge_s = . 
sort resp_id 
foreach v of varlist d72_1 d72_1_spouse { 
       bysort minID maxID: replace dif_animlarge_s  =  (d72_1-d72_1_spouse)/d72_1_average 
} 
replace dif_animlarge_s=0 if d72_1==0 & d72_1_spouse==0 
br resp_id pair_id couple_id spouse_id spouse_id2 minID  d72_1 d72_1_spouse dif_animlarge_s if 
dif_animlarge_s==. // no missing variables 
 
*2: Goats & Sheep 
sort couple_id resp_id  
by couple_id: gen d72_2_spouse=d72_2[spouse_id2] 
by couple_id: gen d72_2_average=(d72_2+d72_2_spouse)/2 
gen dif_goatsheep_s = . 
sort resp_id 
foreach v of varlist d72_2 d72_2_spouse { 
       bysort minID maxID: replace dif_goatsheep_s  =  (d72_2-d72_2_spouse)/d72_2_average 
} 
replace dif_goatsheep_s=0 if d72_2==0 & d72_2_spouse==0 
br resp_id pair_id  couple_id spouse_id spouse_id2 minID  d72_2 d72_2_spouse dif_goatsheep_s if 
dif_goatsheep_s==. // no missing variables 
*3: Pigs 
sort couple_id resp_id  
by couple_id: gen d72_3_spouse=d72_3[spouse_id2] 
by couple_id: gen d72_3_average=(d72_3+d72_3_spouse)/2 
gen dif_pigs_s = . 
sort resp_id 
foreach v of varlist d72_3 d72_3_spouse { 




replace dif_pigs_s=0 if d72_3==0 & d72_3_spouse==0 
br resp_id pair_id  couple_id spouse_id spouse_id2 minID  d72_3 d72_3_spouse dif_pigs_s if 




sort couple_id resp_id  
by couple_id: gen d72_4_spouse=d72_4[spouse_id2] 
by couple_id: gen d72_4_average=(d72_4+d72_4_spouse)/2 
gen dif_poultry_s = . 
sort resp_id 
foreach v of varlist d72_4 d72_4_spouse { 
       bysort minID maxID: replace dif_poultry_s  =  (d72_4-d72_4_spouse)/d72_4_average 
} 
replace dif_poultry_s=0 if d72_4==0 & d72_4_spouse==0 
br resp_id pair_id  couple_id spouse_id spouse_id2 minID  d72_4 d72_4_spouse dif_poultry_s if 
dif_poultry_s==. //1 individual responded .b  
 
foreach v of varlist d72_4 { 




//  *STEP 3: MAKE THE DIFFERENCES ALL POSITIVE   \\ 
////////////////////////\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 
*In order to have the same information asymmetry index for both spouses. Remember: 1 index per 
household. 
replace dif_bicycle= -dif_bicycle if dif_bicycle <0 
replace dif_motorcycle= -dif_motorcycle if dif_motorcycle <0 
replace dif_vehicle = -dif_vehicle if dif_vehicle <0 
replace dif_tractor = -dif_tractor if dif_tractor <0 
replace dif_oxplough = -dif_oxplough if dif_oxplough <0 
replace dif_agrmachinery = -dif_agrmachinery if dif_agrmachinery <0 
replace dif_solarpanel = -dif_solarpanel if dif_solarpanel <0 
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replace dif_mobphone = -dif_mobphone if dif_mobphone <0 
replace dif_radio = -dif_radio if dif_radio <0 
replace dif_landowned = -dif_landowned if dif_landowned <0 
replace dif_landrented = -dif_landrented if dif_landrented <0 
replace dif_maizeseed = -dif_maizeseed if dif_maizeseed <0 
replace dif_maizegarden = -dif_maizegarden if dif_maizegarden <0 
replace dif_maizeyield = -dif_maizeyield if dif_maizeyield <0 
replace dif_animlarge_s = -dif_animlarge_s if dif_animlarge_s <0 
replace dif_goatsheep_s = -dif_goatsheep_s if dif_goatsheep_s <0 
replace dif_pigs_s = -dif_pigs_s if dif_pigs_s <0 
replace dif_poultry_s = -dif_poultry_s if dif_poultry_s <0 
************************************************************ 




capture program drop make_index_gr 
capture mata: mata drop icwxmata() 
program make_index_gr 
version 11.1 
    syntax anything [if] 
    gettoken newname anything: anything 
    gettoken wgt anything: anything 
 gettoken sgroup anything: anything 
    local Xvars `anything' 
 marksample touse 
   mata: icwxmata(("`Xvars'"),"`wgt'","`sgroup'", "index") 
 rename index index_`newname' 
end 
mata: 
 function icwxmata(xvars, wgts, sgroups, indexname) 
 { 
  st_view(X=0,.,tokens(xvars)) 
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  st_view(wgt=.,.,wgts) 
  st_view(sgroup=.,.,sgroups) 
  nr = rows(X) 
  nc = cols(X)  
  sg_wgt = wgt:*sgroup 
  sg_wgtst = sg_wgt/sum(sg_wgt) 
  all_wgtst = wgt/sum(wgt) 
  sg_wgtstdM = J(1,nc,1) # sg_wgtst 
  all_wgtstdM = J(1,nc,1) # all_wgtst 
  sg_wgtdmeans = colsum(X:*sg_wgtstdM) 
  sgroup2 = sgroup 
  sgroupdM = J(1,nc,1) # sgroup2 
  sg_meandevs = ((X:*sgroupdM) - (J(nr,1,1) # sg_wgtdmeans):*sgroupdM) 
  all_wgtdmeandevs = X - (J(nr,1,1) # sg_wgtdmeans) 
  sg_wgtdstds = sqrt(colsum(sg_wgt:*(sg_meandevs:*sg_meandevs)):/(sum(sg_wgt)-
1)) 
  Xs = all_wgtdmeandevs:/(J(nr,1,1) # sg_wgtdstds) 
  S = variance(Xs, wgt) 
  invS = invsym(S) 
  ivec = J(nc,1,1) 
  indexout_sc = (invsym(ivec'*invS*ivec)*ivec'*invS*Xs')' 
  indexout = indexout_sc/sqrt(variance(indexout_sc, sg_wgt)) 
  st_addvar("float",indexname) 




****creating weight and stdgroup variable**** 
generate wgt = 1 








local local_information dif_bicycle dif_motorcycle dif_vehicle dif_tractor dif_oxplough dif_agrmachinery 
dif_solarpanel dif_mobphone dif_radio dif_landowned dif_landrented dif_crops dif_maizeseed 
dif_maizegarden dif_maizeyield dif_loan dif_animlarge_s dif_goatsheep_s dif_pigs_s dif_poultry_s  
make_index_gr information wgt stdgroup `local_information'  
summarize index_information 
br resp_id dif_bicycle dif_motorcycle dif_vehicle dif_tractor dif_oxplough dif_agrmachinery dif_solarpanel 
dif_mobphone dif_radio dif_landowned dif_landrented dif_crops dif_maizeseed dif_maizegarden 
dif_maizeyield dif_loan dif_animlarge_s dif_goatsheep_s dif_pigs_s dif_poultry_s dif_crops 
index_information 
*With and without dif_crops 
local local_information2 dif_bicycle dif_motorcycle dif_vehicle dif_tractor dif_oxplough dif_agrmachinery 
dif_solarpanel dif_mobphone dif_radio dif_landowned dif_landrented dif_maizeseed dif_maizegarden 
dif_maizeyield dif_loan dif_animlarge_s dif_goatsheep_s dif_pigs_s dif_poultry_s  
make_index_gr information2 wgt stdgroup `local_information2'  
summarize index_information2 
br index_information index_information2 
A.3.2 Create Agricultural Investment Level Variable and Run Regressions 
version 13 
/* 
Thesis Leonie Schenkel 
Household analysis 
Data from PROMO project LIB 
Creating investment variable // With 5 important crops grown 
Created On 2020-05-25 




do "C:\Users\Gebruiker\Dropbox\PROMO LIF data analysis\Do files\03 HH analysis\Final files\Information 
asymmetry index variable.do" 
//////////////////////////////// \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 
////////////// Step 1: create variables for investments \\\\\\\\\\\ 
//////////////////////////////// \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 
/////////////////////////\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 







label variable num_invest "Amount of investments as reported by individual" 
sort couple_id resp_id 
by couple_id:gen num_invest_spouse=num_invest[spouse_id2] 
by couple_id:gen num_invest_av=(num_invest+num_invest_spouse)/2 
label variable num_invest_spouse "Amount of investments as reported by spouse" 
label variable num_invest_av "Average amount of investments for couple" 
//////////////////////////\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 
////////////// 1.2 Investments in 5 crops \\\\\\\\\\\\\ 
//////////////////////////\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 
/////////// Recode variables investments \\\\\\\\\\\\\ 






label variable crop_invest "Amount of investments for the 5 important crops, as reported by individual" 
sort couple_id resp_id 
by couple_id:gen crop_invest_spouse=crop_invest[spouse_id2] 
by couple_id:gen crop_invest_av=(crop_invest+crop_invest_spouse)/2 
label variable crop_invest_spouse "Amount of investments for the 5 important crops, as reported by 
spouse" 
label variable crop_invest_av "Average amount of investments for the 5 important crops for the couple" 








label variable crop_invest2 "Amount of investments for all crops, as reported by individual" 
sort couple_id resp_id 
by couple_id:gen crop_invest2_spouse=crop_invest2[spouse_id2] 
by couple_id:gen crop_invest2_av=(crop_invest2+crop_invest2_spouse)/2 
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label variable crop_invest2_spouse "Amount of investments for all crops, as reported by spouse" 
label variable crop_invest2_av "Average amount of investments for all crops for the couple" 
 
/////////////////////////\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 
////////////// 1.3 Maize Investments  \\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 
/////////////////////////\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 
////////// D27A Maize varieties \\\\ 
generate inv_maizevariety=. 
replace inv_maizevariety=1 if d27_Hybrids==1  
replace inv_maizevariety=1 if d27_OPV_L==1 
replace inv_maizevariety=0 if d27_Local==1 
replace inv_maizevariety=0 if d27_Uns==1 
replace inv_maizevariety=0 if d20_1==0 
replace inv_maizevariety=0 if d27_999==1 
replace d37=0 if d37==. //Missing because they reported they don't grow maize 
replace d38=0 if d38==.  
//////// Generate Maize investment variable \\\\\\\\\\\ 
gen maizeinv=(inv_maizevariety+d37+d38) 
label variable maizeinv "Investments in maize, as reported by individual" 
sort couple_id resp_id 
by couple_id:gen maizeinv_spouse=maizeinv[spouse_id2] 
by couple_id:gen maizeinv_av=(maizeinv+maizeinv_spouse)/2 
label variable maizeinv_spouse "Investments in maize, as reported by spouse" 
label variable maizeinv_av "Average investments in maize for the couple" 
//////////////////////////////// \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 
////////////// Step 2: create investment index variable \\\\\\\\\\\ 
//////////////////////////////// \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 
local local_investment num_invest crop_invest maizeinv  
make_index_gr investment wgt stdgroup `local_investment'  
local local_investment_av num_invest_av crop_invest_av maizeinv_av 
make_index_gr investment_av wgt stdgroup `local_investment_av'  
local local_investment2 num_invest crop_invest2 maizeinv //To control using "Amount of investments for 
all 22 crops" 
make_index_gr investment2 wgt stdgroup `local_investment2' 
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local local_investment2_av num_invest_av crop_invest2_av maizeinv_av //To control using "Amount of 
investments for all 22 crops" 
make_index_gr investment2_av wgt stdgroup `local_investment2_av' 
 
//////////////////////////////// \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 
////////////// Step 3: create control variables \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 
//////////////////////////////// \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 
**************************************************** 
***************  Control variables ***************** 
**************************************************** 
////////// Wealth index variable \\\\\\\\\\\ 
replace d15=0 if resp_id==2210042 //2 respondents answered d15==.b. Therefore, replace with answer 
spouse here, so there is no missing variable.  
replace d15=65 if resp_id==2280032 
rename cross cross_animal 
local local_wealth d11 d12 d13 d141 d142 d143 d144 d146 d147 d148 d149 d1410 d15 d71_1 d71_2 
d71_3 d71_4 cross_animal exotic // with land size, with cross & exotic 
make_index_gr wealth wgt stdgroup `local_wealth'  
 
///////// Wealth average index variable  \\\\\\\\\\\\ 
sort couple_id resp_id 
by couple_id:gen d11_spouse=d11[spouse_id2] 
by couple_id:gen d11_av=(d11+d11_spouse)/2 
sort couple_id resp_id 
by couple_id:gen d12_spouse=d12[spouse_id2] 
by couple_id:gen d12_av=(d12+d12_spouse)/2 
 
sort couple_id resp_id 
by couple_id:gen d13_spouse=d13[spouse_id2] 
by couple_id:gen d13_av=(d13+d13_spouse)/2 
sort couple_id resp_id 
by couple_id:gen d71_1_spouse=d71_1[spouse_id2] 
by couple_id:gen d71_1_av=(d71_1+d71_1_spouse)/2 
sort couple_id resp_id 
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by couple_id:gen d71_2_spouse=d71_2[spouse_id2] 
by couple_id:gen d71_2_av=(d71_2+d71_2_spouse)/2 
sort couple_id resp_id 
by couple_id:gen d71_3_spouse=d71_3[spouse_id2] 
by couple_id:gen d71_3_av=(d71_3+d71_3_spouse)/2 
sort couple_id resp_id 
by couple_id:gen d71_4_spouse=d71_4[spouse_id2] 
by couple_id:gen d71_4_av=(d71_4+d71_4_spouse)/2 
sort couple_id resp_id 
by couple_id:gen cross_animal_spouse=cross_animal[spouse_id2] 
by couple_id:gen cross_animal_av=(cross_animal+cross_animal_spouse)/2 
sort couple_id resp_id 
by couple_id:gen exotic_spouse=exotic[spouse_id2] 
by couple_id:gen exotic_av=(exotic+exotic_spouse)/2 
local local_wealth_av d11_av d12_av d13_av d141_average d142_average d143_average d144_average 
d146_average d147_average d148_average d149_average d1410_average d15_average d71_1_av 
d71_2_av d71_3_av d71_4_av cross_animal_av exotic_av  
 
///////// Other control variables \\\\\\\\\\ 
gen age_husband=. 
replace age_husband=age if gender==0 
sort resp_id 
bys couple_id: replace age_husband=age[spouse_id2] if gender==1 
gen secondary=. 
replace secondary=1 if d4==4 | d4==5 | d4==6 | d4==7 | d4==8  
replace secondary=0 if d4==1 | d4==2 | d4==3 | d4==777 
label var secondary "Respondent has received at least some secondary education (O-level or higher)" 
gen secondary_hus=. 
replace secondary_hus=1 if d4==4 & gender==0| d4==5 & gender==0| d4==6 & gender==0| d4==7 
& gender==0| d4==8 & gender==0 
replace secondary_hus=0 if d4==1 & gender==0| d4==2 & gender==0 | d4==3 & gender==0| 
d4==777 & gender==0 
sort couple_id resp_id 
by couple_id:gen secondary_hus_test=secondary[spouse_id2] if gender==1 





replace secondary_wife=1 if d4==4 & gender==1| d4==5 & gender==1| d4==6 & gender==1| d4==7 
& gender==1| d4==8 & gender==1 
replace secondary_wife=0 if d4==1 & gender==1| d4==2 & gender==1 | d4==3 & gender==1| 
d4==777 & gender==1 
sort couple_id resp_id 
by couple_id:gen secondary_wife_test=secondary[spouse_id2] if gender==0 




/////////////////// Step 4: Run regressions  \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 
//////////////////////////////// \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 
ssc install outreg2 
*1. Using data from both spouses, with average investment levels 
regress index_investment_av index_information index_wealth_av age_husband secondary_hus district if 
gender==0 // Could likewise be gender==1 
outreg2 using "C:\Users\Gebruiker\Documents\MID\Thesis\Data\Exporting tables", word replace 
title("Table 1: OLS regression results for Hypothesis 1, outcome agricultural investment level") 
ctitle(average investment level) addnote(test)  
*2. Using data from male respondents 
regress index_investment index_information index_wealth_av age_husband secondary_hus district if 
gender==0 
outreg2 using "C:\Users\Gebruiker\Documents\MID\Thesis\Data\Exporting tables", word append 
ctitle(investment level, using male data)  
*3. Using data from female respondents  
regress index_investment index_information index_wealth_av age_husband secondary_hus district if 
gender==1 
outreg2 using "C:\Users\Gebruiker\Documents\MID\Thesis\Data\Exporting tables", word append 
ctitle(investment level, using female data)  
 
************ Robustness checks ****************** 
***** RC1: Wealth control as reported by male, female 
* Using data from male respondents 





outreg2 using "C:\Users\Gebruiker\Documents\MID\Thesis\Data\Robustness check1", word replace 
title("Table X: Robustness Check 1 for Hypothesis 1, outcome agricultural investment level") 
ctitle(Investment level based on husbands' reports) addnote(test)  
 
* Using data from female respondents 
regress index_investment index_information index_wealth age_husband secondary_hus district if 
gender==1 
outreg2 using "C:\Users\Gebruiker\Documents\MID\Thesis\Data\Robustness check1", word append 
ctitle(Investment level based on wives' reports)  
 
***** RC2: Adapting investment index 
 
*1. Using data from both spouses, with average investment levels 
regress index_investment2_av index_information index_wealth_av age_husband secondary_hus district 
if gender==0 // Could likewise be gender==1 
outreg2 using "C:\Users\Gebruiker\Documents\MID\Thesis\Data\Robustness check2", word replace 
title("Table 1: OLS regression results for Hypothesis 1, outcome agricultural investment level") 
ctitle(average investment level) addnote(test)  
*2. Using data from male respondents 
regress index_investment2 index_information index_wealth_av age_husband secondary_hus district if 
gender==0 
outreg2 using "C:\Users\Gebruiker\Documents\MID\Thesis\Data\Robustness check2", word append 
ctitle(investment level, using male data)  
 
*3. Using data from female respondents  
regress index_investment2 index_information index_wealth_av age_husband secondary_hus district if 
gender==1 
outreg2 using "C:\Users\Gebruiker\Documents\MID\Thesis\Data\Robustness check2", word append 
ctitle(investment level, using female data)  
***** RC3: Adapting Information asymmetry index 
*1. Using data from both spouses, with average investment levels 
regress index_investment_av index_information2 index_wealth_av age_husband secondary_hus district 
if gender==0 // Could likewise be gender==1 
outreg2 using "C:\Users\Gebruiker\Documents\MID\Thesis\Data\Robustness check3", word replace 
title("Table 1: OLS regression results for Hypothesis 1, outcome agricultural investment level") 
ctitle(Investment level based on spouses’ average reports) addnote(test)  
*2. Using data from male respondents 
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regress index_investment index_information2 index_wealth_av age_husband secondary_hus district if 
gender==0 
outreg2 using "C:\Users\Gebruiker\Documents\MID\Thesis\Data\Robustness check3", word append 
ctitle(Investment level based on husbands' reports)  
 
*3. Using data from female respondents  
regress index_investment index_information2 index_wealth_av age_husband secondary_hus district if 
gender==1 
outreg2 using "C:\Users\Gebruiker\Documents\MID\Thesis\Data\Robustness check3", word append 
ctitle(Investment level based on wives' reports)  
 
 
A.3.3 Create Risk Aversion Variable and run regressions 
version 13 
/* 
Thesis Leonie Schenkel 
Household analysis 
Data from PROMO project LIB 
File to test Holt Laury Lottery 
Some codes from Berber Kramer, adapted by Leonie Schenkel 
Created On  2020-09-07 




set more off 
use "C:\Users\Gebruiker\Dropbox\PROMO LIF data analysis\Data\Clean\LIF clean_13.dta", clear 
 
// Drop respondents that are not part of the sample used in the analysis 
 
drop if paired==. 
*(116 observations deleted) 
drop if paired==0 
*(120 observations deleted) 
 
keep resp_id c4_1 c5_1 c6_1 c7_1 c8_1 c9_1 c10_1 c11_1 
 
rename c4_1 Round1 
rename c5_1 Round2 
rename c6_1 Round3 
rename c7_1 Round4 
rename c8_1 Round5 
rename c9_1 Round6 
rename c10_1 Round7 
rename c11_1 Round8 
 






foreach var of varlist Round { 
                 replace bagB=0 if Round==1 
     replace bagB=1 if Round==2 
          } 
 
*Generate Variable Switch 
sort resp_id roundnr 
by resp_id: g switch = roundnr if bagB[_n-1] == 0 & bagB== 1 
lab var switch "Round switching to risky bag (bag B)" 
 
///Some respondents never switch to B -->  Very risk averse people (P=0.875 for high prize).  
replace switch=9 if roundnr==8 & Round==1    
replace switch=1 if roundnr==1 & Round==2 /// This respondent probably didn't understand the 
lottery!! 
 
by resp_id: keep if switch != .  
 
*Check for Duplicates 
duplicates report resp_id // There are duplicates --> Because of inconsistencies 
sort resp_id 
quietly by resp_id:  gen dup = cond(_N==1,0,_n) 
br if dup!=0 
sort resp_id roundnr 
by resp_id: g inconsistent = 1 if dup!=0 
lab var inconsistent "Respondent giving inconsistent responses" 
 
duplicates report resp_id  
 
*Drop duplicates 








label var LRA "Level of Risk-aversion; 1=Risk-seeking; 2=Risk-neutral; 3=Risk-averse; 4=Risk-
Inconsistent" 
replace LRA=1 if switch==2 | switch==3 | switch==4 
replace LRA=2 if switch==5 
replace LRA=3 if switch==6 | switch==7 | switch==8 | switch==9 
replace LRA=4 if inconsistent==1 | switch==1 
 
gen RS=. 
replace RS=1 if switch==1 | switch==2 | switch==3 | switch==4 





replace RN=1 if switch==5 




replace RA=1 if switch==6 | switch==7 | switch==8 | switch==9 
replace RA=0 if switch==1 | switch==2 | switch==3 | switch==4 | switch==5 
 
gen RI=. 
replace RI=0 if switch==2 | switch==3 | switch==4 | switch==5 | switch==6 | switch==7 | switch==8 | 
switch==9 
replace RI=1 if switch==1 
replace RI=1 if inconsistent==1 
 
sort resp_id 
bys couple_id: gen LRA_spouse=LRA[spouse_id2] 
order LRA, after (LRA_spouse) 
order LRA_spouse, after (LRA) 




bys couple_id: gen switch_spouse=switch[spouse_id2] 
order switch, after (switch_spouse) 
order switch_spouse, after (switch) 
label var switch_spouse "Spousal Round switching to risky bag (bag B)" 
 
bys couple_id: gen LRA_Husband=LRA if gender==0 
bys couple_id: replace LRA_Husband=LRA_spouse if gender==1 
label var LRA_Husband "Level of Risk-aversion of the husband" 
 
bys couple_id: gen LRA_Wife=LRA if gender==1 
bys couple_id: replace LRA_Wife=LRA_spouse if gender==0 
label var LRA_Wife "Level of Risk-aversion of the wife" 
 
bys couple_id: gen switch_Husband=switch if gender==0 
bys couple_id: replace switch_Husband=switch_spouse if gender==1 
label var switch_Husband "Switch round husband" 
 
by couple_id: gen switch_Wife=switch if gender==1 
by couple_id: replace switch_Wife=switch_spouse if gender==0 
label var switch_Wife "Switch round wife" 
 
sort resp_id 
bys couple_id: gen RS_husband=RS[spouse_id2] if gender==1 
replace RS_husband=RS if gender==0 
 
sort resp_id 
bys couple_id: gen RS_wife=RS[spouse_id2] if gender==0 





bys couple_id: gen RN_husband=RN[spouse_id2] if gender==1 
replace RN_husband=RN if gender==0 
 
sort resp_id 
bys couple_id: gen RN_wife=RN[spouse_id2] if gender==0 
replace RN_wife=RN if gender==1 
 
sort resp_id 
bys couple_id: gen RA_husband=RA[spouse_id2] if gender==1 
replace RA_husband=RA if gender==0 
 
sort resp_id 
bys couple_id: gen RA_wife=RA[spouse_id2] if gender==0 
replace RA_wife=RA if gender==1 
 
sort resp_id 
bys couple_id: gen RI_husband=RI[spouse_id2] if gender==1 
replace RI_husband=RI if gender==0 
 
sort resp_id 
bys couple_id: gen RI_wife=RI[spouse_id2] if gender==0 






***PART 1: Regressions with 4 categories *** ///  without dropping inconsistent respondents 
 
*1. Using data from both spouses, with average investment levels 
regress index_investment_av RN_husband RA_husband RI_husband RN_wife RA_wife RI_wife 
index_wealth_av age_husband secondary_hus district if gender==0  // Could likewise be gender==1 
 
outreg2 using "C:\Users\Gebruiker\Documents\MID\Thesis\Data\Risk categories", word replace 
title("Table 2: OLS regression results for Hypothesis 2, outcome agricultural investment level") 
ctitle(Investment level based on spouses’ average reports) addnote(test)  
 
*2. Using data from male respondents 
regress index_investment RN_husband RA_husband RI_husband RN_wife RA_wife RI_wife 
index_wealth_av age_husband secondary_hus district if gender==0   
 
outreg2 using "C:\Users\Gebruiker\Documents\MID\Thesis\Data\Risk categories", word append 
ctitle(Investment level based on husbands’ reports)  
 
*3. Using data from female respondents  
regress index_investment RN_husband RA_husband RI_husband RN_wife RA_wife RI_wife 
index_wealth_av age_husband secondary_hus district if gender==1 
 
outreg2 using "C:\Users\Gebruiker\Documents\MID\Thesis\Data\Risk categories", word append 





* Robustness checks PART 1: 
 
*** Regressions with  categories *** /// Robustness check: without dropping inconsistent respondents 
regress index_investment_av LRA_Husband LRA_Wife index_wealth_av age_husband secondary_hus 
district if gender==0   
 
outreg2 using "C:\Users\Gebruiker\Documents\MID\Thesis\Data\Robustness check1\Risk 
categories_RC", word replace title("Table 3: OLS regression results for Hypothesis 2, outcome 
agricultural investment level") ctitle(Investment level based on spouses’ average reports) 
addnote(test)  
 
regress index_investment LRA_Husband LRA_Wife index_wealth_av age_husband secondary_hus 
district if gender==0 
 
outreg2 using "C:\Users\Gebruiker\Documents\MID\Thesis\Data\Robustness check1\Risk 
categories_RC", word append ctitle(Investment level based on husbands’ reports)  
 
regress index_investment LRA_Husband LRA_Wife index_wealth_av age_husband secondary_hus 
district if gender==1 
 
outreg2 using "C:\Users\Gebruiker\Documents\MID\Thesis\Data\Robustness check1\Risk 
categories_RC", word append ctitle(Investment level based on wives’ reports)  
 
 
*** PART  2 Regression with 8 (9) Switching Rounds*** /// without dropping inconsistent respondents 
 
*1. Using data from both spouses, with average investment levels 
regress index_investment_av switch_Husband switch_Wife index_wealth_av age_husband 
secondary_hus district if gender==0  // Could likewise be gender==1 
 
outreg2 using "C:\Users\Gebruiker\Documents\MID\Thesis\Data\Switching Rounds", word replace 
title("Table 2: OLS regression results for Hypothesis 2, outcome agricultural investment level") 
ctitle(Investment level based on spouses’ average reports) addnote(test)  
 
*2. Using data from male respondents 
regress index_investment switch_Husband switch_Wife index_wealth_av age_husband 
secondary_hus district if gender==0  
 
outreg2 using "C:\Users\Gebruiker\Documents\MID\Thesis\Data\Switching Rounds", word append 
ctitle(Investment level based on husbands’ reports)  
 
*3. Using data from female respondents  
regress index_investment switch_Husband switch_Wife index_wealth_av age_husband 
secondary_hus district if gender==1 
 
outreg2 using "C:\Users\Gebruiker\Documents\MID\Thesis\Data\Switching Rounds", word append 
ctitle(Investment level based on wives’ reports)  
 
* Robustness checks PART 2: 
 
*2. Using data from male respondents 
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regress index_investment switch_Husband switch_Wife index_wealth age_husband secondary_hus 
district if gender==0   
 
outreg2 using "C:\Users\Gebruiker\Documents\MID\Thesis\Data\Switching Rounds_RC", word 
replace title("Table 2: OLS regression results for Hypothesis 2, outcome agricultural investment level") 
ctitle(Investment level based on husbands’ reports) addnote(test) 
 
*3. Using data from female respondents  
regress index_investment switch_Husband switch_Wife index_wealth age_husband secondary_hus 
district if gender==1 
 
outreg2 using "C:\Users\Gebruiker\Documents\MID\Thesis\Data\Switching Rounds_RC", word 




A.3.4 Descriptive Statistics Tables 
version 13 
/* 
Thesis Leonie Schenkel 
Household analysis 
Data from PROMO project LIB 
File to make Descriptive Statistics table 
Created by Leonie Schenkel 
Created On  2020-09-30 




//////////// Descriptives Table Study Sample \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 
 
 
* Delete d4=777 --> high influence on average 
 
use "C:\Users\Gebruiker\Dropbox\PROMO LIF data analysis\Do files\03 HH analysis\Final 
files\Descriptives_HL.dta", clear 
replace d4=. if d4==777 
replace d27_Local=0 if d27_Local==. 
estpost sum age secondary d4 d15 d27_Local inv_maizevariety d75     
esttab using Sample_Descriptives.rtf, replace cells("count(fmt(a2)) mean sd") /// 
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title("Descriptives Statistics of Study Sample") 
 
//////// Descriptives Investment Index Variables \\\\\\\\\\\\\ 
 
*1. Investments 
use "C:\Users\Gebruiker\Dropbox\PROMO LIF data analysis\Do files\03 HH analysis\Final 
files\Descriptives_HL.dta", clear 
estpost tabstat d19_1 d19_2 d19_3 d19_4 d19_5 d19_6 d19_7 d19_8 d19_9 d19_10 d19_11 d19_12 
d19_13, by(gender) /// 
statistics(mean sd) columns(statistics) listwise 
esttab using Descriptives_Investments_Final5.rtf, main(mean) aux(sd) nostar unstack /// 
noobs nonote label 
 
*2. Crop Investments 
use "C:\Users\Gebruiker\Dropbox\PROMO LIF data analysis\Do files\03 HH analysis\Final 
files\Descriptives_HL.dta", clear 
estpost tabstat maize_21 beans_21 cassava_21 groundnuts_21 sweetpotato_21 maize_22 beans_22 
cassava_22 groundnuts_22 sweetpotato_22 maize_23 beans_23 cassava_23 groundnuts_23 
sweetpotato_23 maize_24 beans_24 cassava_24 groundnuts_24 sweetpotato_24, by(gender) /// 
statistics(mean sd) columns(statistics) listwise 
esttab using Descriptives_CropInvestments_Final.rtf, main(mean) aux(sd) nostar unstack /// 
noobs nonote label 
 
*3. Maize Investments 
use "C:\Users\Gebruiker\Dropbox\PROMO LIF data analysis\Do files\03 HH analysis\Final 
files\Descriptives_HL.dta", clear 
estpost tabstat inv_maizevariety d37 d38, by(gender) /// 
statistics(mean sd) columns(statistics) listwise 
esttab using Descriptives_MaizeInvestments_Final.rtf,  main(mean) aux(sd) nostar unstack /// 




///////////// Descriptives Table Information Asymmetry Index \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 
 
*PART 1: Just the variables (ANNEX) 
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ssc install estout, replace 
use "C:\Users\Gebruiker\Dropbox\PROMO LIF data analysis\Do files\03 HH analysis\Final 
files\Descriptives_HL.dta", clear 
estpost sum d141 d142 d143 d144 d146 d147 d148 d149 d1410 d15 d18 d20_1 d20_2 d20_3 d20_4 
d20_5 d20_6 d20_7 d20_8 d20_9 d20_10 d20_11 d20_12 d20_13 d20_14 d20_15 d20_16 d20_17 
d20_18 d20_19 d20_20 d20_21 d20_22 d30 d31 d32 d57 d72_1 d72_2 d72_3 d72_4 
esttab using Descriptives_asymvariab.rtf, replace cells("count(fmt(a2)) mean sd min max") /// 
title("Descriptive statistics: Variables used to create Information Asymmetry index") 
 
*Main text 
use "C:\Users\Gebruiker\Dropbox\PROMO LIF data analysis\Do files\03 HH analysis\Final 
files\Descriptives_HL.dta", clear 
estpost sum dif_bicycle dif_motorcycle dif_vehicle dif_tractor dif_oxplough dif_agrmachinery 
dif_solarpanel dif_mobphone dif_radio dif_landowned dif_landrented dif_crops dif_maizeseed 
dif_maizegarden dif_maizeyield dif_loan dif_animlarge_s dif_goatsheep_s dif_pigs_s dif_poultry_s if 
gender==0 
esttab using Descriptives.rtf, replace cells("count(fmt(a2)) mean sd min max") /// 
title("Descriptive statistics: Differences in Reported Answers on Asset Variables") 
 
 
//////////////Descriptives Wealth Variable \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 
 
ssc install estout, replace 
use "C:\Users\Gebruiker\Dropbox\PROMO LIF data analysis\Do files\03 HH analysis\Final 
files\Descriptives_HL.dta", clear 
estpost sum d11_av d12_av d13_av d141_av d142_av d143_av d144_av d146_av d147_av d148_av 
d149_av d1410_av d15_av d71_1_av d71_2_av d71_3_av d71_4_av cross_animal_av exotic_av if 
gender==0  
esttab using Descriptives_Wealth_Final.rtf, replace cells("count(fmt(a2)) mean sd min max") /// 
title("Descriptives: Household Wealth Control Index Variable") 
 
 
////////////// Descriptive Statistics Outcome and Explanatory variables \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 
 
use "C:\Users\Gebruiker\Dropbox\PROMO LIF data analysis\Do files\03 HH analysis\Final 
files\Descriptives_HL.dta", clear 
 
by couple_id:gen switch_av=(switch_Husband+switch_Wife)/2 
63 
 
gen index_investmentf=index_investment if gender==1 
gen index_investmentm=index_investment if gender==0 
gen index_investmentav=index_investment_av if gender==1 
gen index_wealthf=index_wealth if gender==1 
gen index_wealthm=index_wealth if gender==0 
gen index_wealthav=index_wealth_av if gender==1 
gen index_informationf=index_information if gender==1 
gen index_informationm=index_information if gender==0 
gen age_m=age if gender==0 
gen secondary_m=secondary if gender==0 
gen switch_Husband2=switch_Husband if gender==0 
gen switch_Wife2=switch_Wife if gender==1 
gen RN_husband2=RN_husband if gender==0 
gen RA_husband2=RA_husband if gender==0 
gen RI_husband2=RI_husband if gender==0 
gen RS_husband2=RS_husband if gender==0 
gen RN_wife2=RN_wife if gender==1 
gen RA_wife2=RA_wife if gender==1 
gen RI_wife2=RI_wife if gender==1 
gen RS_wife2=RS_wife if gender==1 
 
estpost sum index_investmentav index_investmentm index_investmentf index_informationm 
switch_Husband2 switch_Wife2 RN_husband2 RA_husband2 RI_husband2 RS_husband2 RN_wife2 
RA_wife2 RI_wife2 RS_wife2 index_wealthav2 index_wealthm index_wealthf age_m secondary_m  
esttab using Descriptives_outcome_Final.rtf, replace cells("count(fmt(a2)) mean sd min max") /// 
title("Descriptives Statistics Outcome and Explanatory Variables") 
 
 
 
 
 
 
